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Abstract
This study investigates facility location problems in the presence of facility disruptions. Two
types of problems are investigated. Firstly, we study a facility location problem considering
random disruptions. Secondly, we study a facility fortification problem considering
disruptions caused by random failures and intelligent attacks.
We first study a reliable facility location problem in which facilities are faced with the
risk of random disruptions. In the literature, reliable facility location models and solution
methods have been proposed under different assumptions of the disruption distribution. In
most of these models, the disruption distribution is assumed to be completely known, that
is, the disruptions are known to be uncorrelated or to follow a certain distribution. In
practice, we may have only limited information about the distribution. In this work, we
propose a robust reliable facility location model that considers the worst-case distribution
with incomplete information. Because the model imposes fewer distributional assumptions,
it includes several important reliable facility location problems as special cases. We propose
an effective cutting plane algorithm based on the supermodularity of the problem. For the
case in which the distribution is completely known, we develop a heuristic algorithm called
multi-start tabu search to solve very large instances.
v
In the second part of the work, we study an r-interdiction median problem with
fortification that simultaneously considers two types of disruption risks: random disruptions
that happen probabilistically and disruptions caused by intentional attacks. The problem is
to determine the allocation of limited facility fortification resources to an existing network.
The problem is modeled as a bi-level programming model that generalizes the r-interdiction
median problem with probabilistic fortification. The lower level problem, that is, the
interdiction problem, is a challenging high-degree non-linear model. In the literature, only
the enumeration method is applied to solve a special case of the problem. By exploring the
special structure property of the problem, we propose an exact cutting plane method for
the problem. For the fortification problem, an effective logic based Benders decomposition
algorithm is proposed.
vi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Due to globalization and the widely applied philosophy of lean production, today’s supply
chains are more vulnerable to disruptions; severe consequences occur even if only a few critical
components fail. Facilities are one of the most critical components in supply chain networks.
Facility failure leads to massive negative effects, such as a substantial increase in both service
costs and customer dissatisfaction. These failures can be caused by natural disasters, such as
hurricanes and earthquakes, and intentional or unintentional human actions, such as labor
strikes, fires, malicious cyber-attacks and terrorist strikes.
In response to facility disruption risks, both proactive and reactive mitigation options
can be used to improve supply chain reliability. An ideal network design should implement
and integrate all of these options to make the network risk resilient and cost-effective. One
proactive option is to add redundant facilities in the network design phase such that the
system can still performance well even when some facilities are disrupted. Another option is
to harden or fortify facilities such that they have a smaller chance of being disrupted. The
risk of facility disruption decreases by introducing built-in redundancy, investing to enhance
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facility infrastructure, and assuring rapid recovery from disruption. In this dissertation, we
focus on optimizing the strategic decision of locating and fortifying facilities, as the effects
of disruption can be significantly reduced with optimized decisions at the strategic level.
1.1 Facility Location with Disruption
When designing a supply chain network, one of the most crucial decisions is facility location.
The is a problem often faced by both private firms and the public sectors. For example,
a courier services company must determine where to locate the local stores and sorting
facilities, and city governments must determine locations of schools, hospitals and fire
stations. These decisions directly affect the performance of the networks. Operations
research models have been developed to aid in these decisions.
The simple facility location problem, or the uncapacitated facility location problem
(UFLP), is one of the most well-studied location problems. It can be stated as follows:
given a set of potential facility locations and a set of customers with known demand rates,
one needs to select a subset of these locations at which to set up facilities and determine
customer assignments to minimize total costs. The cost components consist of initial facility
setup costs and day-to-day transportation costs. Figure 1.1 shows a location solution for a
UFLP instance with the 50 largest cities in the U.S. based on 1990 census data. In the UFLP,
the facilities are assumed to be constantly available once they are constructed. However, in
reality, facilities may become unavailable due to disruptive events, such as natural disasters,
terrorist attacks and labor strikes. Although facility failures rarely happen, they can disrupt
the normal operations and impose with high costs. For example, in March of 2000, the fire at
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Figure 1.1: An example of the solution to a facility location problem
the Philips microchip factory in New Mexico, U.S. onsignificantly affected its two customers,
Nokia and Ericsson. The loss of short term revenue is estimated to be at least $400 million
for Ericsson, and the long-term loss was even greater [48]. Other examples, like Hurricane
Katrina in 2005 seriously disrupted national oil and gas production in the Gulf of Mexico,
amounting to nearly 1.4 million barrels lost per day [14], and the Tohoku-Kanto Earthquake
and Tsunami in 2001 caused an estimated $195-305 billion in losses through physical damage
alone [64]. Additional examples can be found in the supply chains literature [16, 88, 78].
The risk of disruption is not a new concept in supply chain management, however, interest
from practitioners and researchers has increased explosively in recent decades. Snyder et al.
[81] give four reasons for this. First, several high-profile events, such as the ones listed above,
attracted considerable public attention. Second, the popularity of the just-in-time philosophy
results in more vulnerable supply chains. Third, because of globalization, companies tend
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to spread their supply chains throughout the world, which increases uncertainty. Lastly, the
topic is reaching critical momentum with the maturation of relevant research.
The need to design supply chain networks that effectively balance efficiency and
robustness requirements motivates this stream of research. We study a reliable version of
UFLP by considering random facility disruptions. In this problem, facility failures have direct
effects on transportation costs. When one facility fails, it loses its entire capacity and the
customers originally assigned to it may have to be served by other working facilities that are
far away, which results in a significant increase in transportation costs. The goal is to design a
reliable and resilient distribution network that operates efficiently in both normal and failure
scenarios. The objective is to minimize setup costs and expected transportation costs. This
problem is referred to as the reliable facility location problem (RFLP). Figure 1.2 shows the
solution of the RFLP assuming the disruption probability of a location is proportional to
its distance from New Orleans. Compared with the location solution given by figure 1.1,
locations near New Orleans are no longer chosen for set-up, and facilities that are far away
with lower disruption probabilities are open.
The RFLP is clearly NP-hard because it generalizes the UFLP. Several models have
been developed in the last decade and both exact and approximation algorithms have been
proposed. However, most RFLP models and algorithms can only deal the problem under
certain assumptions about the nature of the facility failures. For example,
1. The RFLP with the most restrictive assumption that all sites fail with equal probability
and that facility failures are uncorrelated is studied by Snyder and Daskin [82] and Shen
et al. [80].
4
Figure 1.2: An example of the location solution considering disruption risks
2. The problem with heterogeneous failure rates and uncorrelated failures is studied by
Cui et al. [24], Shen et al. [80] and Aboolian et al. [1].
3. The problem with heterogeneous failure rates and correlated failures is rarely studied
in the literature. Li and Ouyang [51] address this problem with a continuum
approximation approach and no exact mathematical programming formulation is
provided.
It is still challenging to exactly solve the problem with large scale instances due to
its complex nature. Therefore, there is a need to develop more efficient algorithms for
the general problem. Moreover, in the works mentioned above, the distribution of the
disruptions is assumed to be fully known by the decision maker. However, it is often
challenging to obtain full information on the disruptions distribution. In this work, we
propose a robust RFLP model that can consider different levels of information visibility. 1.
The disruption distribution is completely known; for example, the disruptions are known
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to be uncorrelated or to follow a certain distribution. 2. Only partial information about
the disruption distribution is known. The proposed model minimizes the setup cost and
expected transportation costs under the worst-case distribution. We propose an effective
cutting plane algorithm that exactly solves for the problem. As a special case, the cutting
plane algorithm solves the RFLP in its general form, that is, with heterogeneous failure rates
and correlated failures. We also provide a heuristic algorithm that can solve large instances
of RFLP within a reasonable amount of time.
1.2 r-interdiction Median Problem with Fortification
In supply chain networks, identifying and then fortifying most critical nodes is an effective
way to hedge against disruption risks in the system. The network fortification problem has
gained increasing attention from researchers in the past decades. However, most research
considers only one type of disruption risk, such as probabilistic risk that models natural
disasters, as in [82, 24, 1], or worst-case risk that models man-made attacks, as in [21, 76, 96].
In reality, disruption risks from different sources exist simultaneously. Therefore, we argue
that it is beneficial to have a general model that is able to consider different disruption risks
simultaneously.
The model we present in this work considers a generalized r-interdiction median problem
with fortification (RIMF). The RIMF is first introduced by Church and Scaparra [21]. In the
RIMF, a network of p operating facilities is given. Facilities are assumed to have unlimited
capability such that customers are always served by the nearest facility. There exists a
malicious attacker who seeks the most critical r facilities to attack such that the effect of the
6
attack on the network’s performance is maximized. The damage is measured by the increase
in total weighted distance between customers and their nearest operating facility after the
attacks. RIMF solves the problem of allocating protective resources to the most critical q
facility in anticipation of the worst-case loss when r facilities are attacked. In the original
RIMF, it is assumed that an attack on a protected facility has no effect and an attack on an
unprotected facility is successful with certainty.
In reality, a fortified facility may still be disrupted by an attack. Therefore, Zhu et al.
[96] propose the r-interdiction median problem with probabilistic fortification (RIMF-p) in
which any facility, even a protected one, may be disrupted by a successful attack with some
probability. The RIMF-p adds uncertainty in the form of both fortification and interdiction
to the RIMF. We study an extension of the RIMF-p with simultaneous risk of probabilistic
disruption and intentional attacks. The proposed model includes the RIMF-p as a special
case, and the RIMF-p includes the original RIMF and the r-interdiction median (RIM)
problem [19] as special cases. We present a bi-level nonlinear mixed-integer programming
model for the problem. Due to its high degree of nonlinearity, the model is difficult to solve
using standard approaches for bi-level programming models. Even only the lower problem,
that is, the attacker’s problem, is considered, there is no efficient solution method proposed in
the literature. In this dissertation, we present an efficient cutting plane method that exactly
solves the attacker’s problem. For the upper level problem, that is, the network defenders’
problem, we propose solution methods based on the logic-based Benders decomposition
framework.
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1.3 Document Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literatures
on facility location and fortification problems considering disruptions. In Chapter 3, we
study the facility location problem with random disruptions. We present the robust reliable
facility location model for the problem. By proving the supermodularity of the problem, we
propose a cutting plane algorithm for the problem. In addition, a multi-start tabu search
algorithm is proposed for solving large instances. The efficiency of the proposed algorithms
is demonstrated with extensive computational studies. In Chapter 4, we study the RIMF
considering both random disruptions and intentional attacks. We present a bi-level model
for the problem. Algorithms are proposed for solving attacker’s problem and defender’s
problem. Computational studies are performed to test the algorithms’ performance. Finally,
Chapter 5 summaries the contributions of this work and pointing out the future research
directions.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we provide an overview of some basic facility location problems that are
relevant to this work in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, we discuss works related to the facility
location problems considering random disruptions. In Section 2.3, we review the related
literature on location problems with fortification.
2.1 Facility Location Problems
Facility location, as a critical strategic decision, has been an important research topic in the
operations research community for a long time. The systematic study of this problem can
be dated to 1909, when Alfred Weber began to study the problem now known as the Weber
problem. This problem aims to locate a warehouse such that the total distance to customers
are minimized. A vast literature has developed since then. In this section, we review only
some of the core location models.
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Depending on the decision space, these location problems can be classified into two major
categories: continuous location problems, in which a facility can be located at any feasible
point in the plane, and discrete location problems, in which facilities are chosen from a set of
given candidate locations. The Weber problem and its extensions, such as the multisource
Weber problem [59, 25] in which p > 1 facilities in the plane has to be determined, belong
to the first category.
The most well-known discrete location problems are perhaps the p-median problem and
p-center problem introduced by Hakimi [39, 40] in the 1960s. In the p-median problem, one
determines the location of p facilities to minimize the weighted average distance between
facilities and customers, whereas the p-center problem seeks to minimize the maximal
distance. The p-median problem and p-center problem are originally introduced as network
location problems in which customers are treated as nodes in a network, and facilities must
be placed on the network. However, most of the literature studies these problems from a
discrete location perspective because of the following properties: for the p-median problem,
Hakimi [40] shows that an optimum can be found by locating facilities among the nodes of
the network, and for the p-center problem, Minieka [63] proves that an optimal solution can
be found by locating facilities among nodes and a finite number of intersection points on the
edge. These two classical problems have received tremendous attention and enormous work
has been developed for them and their variants, see survey papers [73, 75].
Motivated by the needs of optimal location in the public sector, such as locations of
hospitals and fire stations for which there exist constraints on a maximal distance between
a facility and a served customer, Church and Velle [20] introduce the maximal covering
location problem. Similar to the p-center problem, the maximal covering location examines
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the maximal distance between customers and a facility, but unlike the p-center problem, it
includes a fixed covering radius as an input parameter. The goal is to determine facility
locations such that the number of customers who can be covered within a given radius is
maximized. Farahani et al. [32] summarizes the advances for the covering problem.
The study of UFLP began at a similar time to the p-median and p-center problems in
the 1960s, see [56, 28]. As in the p-median problem, the efficiency of the system is measured
by the weighted distance between customers and facilities. However, unlike the p-median
problem in which the number of open facilities is given as a parameter, in the UFLP, the
number of open facilities becomes an endogenous decision and is a trade-off between fixed
location costs and transportation costs. The UFLP has been studied under different names
in the literature, usually composed of an adjective (uncapaciated, simple, or optimal) and a
substantive (plant, warehouse, facility, or site) followed by the word facility [46]. Extensive
work has been devoted to the UFLP and both exact and heuristic algorithms have been
proposed, (e.g., [23, 29, 18, 5]).
In all of previously mentioned location problems, customers are assigned to an open
facility that minimizes assignment cost. However, in the capacitated facility location
problem (CFLP), an importation extension of the UFLP, capacity limit is considered for
each candidate location. In the CFLP, a customer can be supplied by multiple facilities (e.g.,
Geoffrion and Bride [35], Sridharan [84]) unless single sourcing is required, (e.g., [89, 3]).
The models mentioned above are the most basic location models in the location science.
The complexity of realistic industrial settings gives rise to more sophisticated models, for
example, multi-commodity [71, 13, 79], multi-layer [6, 34, 90], and multi-period [43, 66]
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models. Interested readers are referred to recent review papers written by [70] and Melo
et al. [60].
2.2 Reliable Facility Location Problems
According to Snyder et al. [81], Drezner [26] is the first to consider facility disruptions in
facility location models. The author extends the p-median and the p-center problems by
considering random facility disruptions. These extended models are called the unreliable
p-median problem and the (p, q)-center problem, respectively. In these two models, facilities
are assumed to fail with a known probability. In addition, the probability that a customer is
served by his k-nearest facility is known, which greatly simplifies the problem. The author
proposes neighborhood-search-type heuristic algorithms for both problems.
Snyder and Daskin [82] introduce the RFLP. They propose two reliable facility location
models based on p-median and UFLP. Unlike Drezner [26], instead of assuming that the
probability that a customer is served by his k-nearest facility is given, Their models
calculate these probabilities endogenously. With the assumption that all sites have identical
failure probabilities and that disruptions are uncorrelated, the authors propose a Lagrangian
relaxation algorithm to solve the problems.
One obvious shortcoming of Snyder and Daskin [82]’s model is the assumption of identical
failure probabilities. Researchers have developed models that relax this assumption. One
intuitive approach is to explicitly enumerate all or a sample of scenarios. Snyder and Daskin
[83] develop a p-robust model with a minimum-expected-cost solution with the constraint
that relative regret is no more than 100p% in each scenario. Shen et al. [80] formulate
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the RFLP as a two-stage stochastic programming model and apply the sample average
approximation. However, the number of scenarios grows exponentially with the number of
facilities and the model becomes intractable for even moderate-sized problems.
A more practical approach is to calculate the expectation of transportation costs as a non-
linear term within the model, similar to the approach in Snyder and Daskin [82]. However, it
is significantly more difficult to derive such a term with heterogeneous failure probabilities.
Cui et al. [24] propose a nonlinear mixed integer formulation that allows site-dependent
failures and then present an equivalent linear model of the proposed nonlinear model. A
Lagrangian based algorithm is developed to solve the linear model. They also provide a
continuum approximation model for the problem. Shen et al. [80] propose another nonlinear
integer programming model. They use heuristics to find near optimal solutions. They
also develop a 4-approximation algorithm with the identical failure probability assumption.
Berman et al. [10] study a reliable p-median problem with site-dependent failures and develop
exact algorithms and greedy heuristic algorithms. They also derive the worst-case error
bound for the greedy algorithms. O’Hanley et al. [68] provide an alternative linearization
method for reliable facility location models with site-dependent failure probabilities. They
show that their model is highly compact and requires fewer variables and constraints than
the model proposed by Cui et al. [24]. Aboolian et al. [1] develop algorithms that contains
local search heuristics and a cutting plane procedure for the problem with independent and
heterogeneous failures. They first develop a lower bounding model for the RFLP based on
the Cui et al. [24]’s model. The lower bound can be improved by successive cutting planes
which cut off the solutions that have been explored by local search. They show that their
method outperforms the Lagrangian relaxation algorithm proposed by Cui et al. [24] in both
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execution time and solution quality. They also develop efficient heuristics based on local
search to solve large problem instances.
Location problems with disruptions have also been studied in other contexts. Berman
et al. [11] study a location problem in which a customer does not know whether the facility is
working or not until he or she visits it (incomplete information). The objective is to minimize
the expected customers’ travel costs. Greedy heuristic algorithms are proposed. Berman
et al. [12] generalize the problem studied by Berman et al. [11] by considering correlations
across failure events and derive closed-form analytical results under restricted settings, such
as the 2-facility problem on a unit segment. Zhang et al. [95] study the competitive location
problem and formulate it as a bilevel optimization problem. They propose a variable
neighborhood decomposition search heuristic algorithm to solve the problem. Considering
capacity and disruptions together is rare in literature but not unheard of in the literature.
Gade and Pohl [33] extend the CFLP with facility disruptions. The authors use a sample
average approximation algorithm to solve the problem approximately. A similar problem is
studied by Aydin and Murat [8], who propose a swarm intelligence based sample average
approximation (SIBSAA).
In these works, excepting Berman et al. [11] and the scenario based models [83, 80], the
disruptions are assumed to be uncorrelated. The study of reliable facility location problems
under correlated facility disruptions is still rare in the literature. Li and Ouyang [51] study
the RFLP in which facilities are subject to spatially correlated disruptions that occur with
site-dependent probabilities. They use the continuum approximation approach to estimate
and design the complex system. Lu et al. [55] study a reliable facility location problem in
which disruptions are can be correlated according to an uncertain joint distribution. Instead
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of minimizing the expected costs under all scenarios, they apply distributionally robust
optimization techniques to minimize the expected cost under the worst-case distribution. To
the best of our knowledge, no solution method in the literature is able to solve the RFLP
exactly with general correlated disruptions.
There are related papers on supply chain network design problems in more complex
contexts considering disruption risks. Qi et al. [72] study an integrated supply chain design
problem on a two-echelon supply chain. The disruptions may happen at both echelons. They
describe the facility’s disruption-recovery cycles as a stochastic process with memoryless
exponential distributions. Chen et al. [15] propose an integer programming model for a
reliable version of the joint inventory-location problem. They assume that all open facilities
fail independently with an equal probability. Ahmadi-Javid and Seddighi [2] study a reliable
location-routing problem with random disruptions at both facilities and vehicles. Zhang
et al. [94] study a three-tiered supply chain network design problem considering disruptions,
the risk-pooling effect and economies of scale. The authors develop a Lagrangian-relaxation
based algorithm and a heuristic algorithm.
2.3 Location Problem with Fortification
In most models reviewed in Section 2.2, the facility disruption occurs as a probabilistic
random event. Snyder et al. [81] classify this kind of risk as an exogenous risk that cannot
be affected by the decision-maker’s action and is modeled using stochastic processes. The
objective is to minimize the expected costs under all failure scenarios. These models take
the failure risk into consideration at the supply chain design phase and determine optimal
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facility location. The facility fortification option is absent in most of these models except
those in [54, 50]. Lim et al. [54] study a reliable facility location problem in which both
unreliable and reliable (i.e., those that cannot be disrupted) facilities can be set up. They
formulate the problem as a mixed integer programming model and develop a Lagrangian
relaxation-based solution algorithm. They prove that when all of the failure probabilities of
the unreliable facilities are larger or smaller than certain thresholds, the problem reduces to
the classic UFLP. In the model, each customer is assigned to at most an unreliable facility
and then a reliable facility as a backup. However, this approach might be unrealistic when
an unreliable facility fails but a customer can be served by a closer unreliable facility. Li
et al. [50] extend the problem of Lim et al. [54] by considering a limited fortification budget.
A closely related stream of research studies location problems where the disruption risk
can be mitigated by fortifying facilities. This stream of research originates from the works
of Church et al. [19] and Church and Scaparra [21]. Their model considers the disruption
risks caused by intelligent intentional attacks. In these models, the disruptions are modeled
explicitly by decision variables rather than random events. Snyder et al. [81] classify this
kind of risk as endogenous risk. The objective is to fortify an existing network to minimize
network costs anticipating worst-case attacks.
Church et al. [19] propose two interdiction models: the r-interdiction median problem
(RIM) and the r-interdiction covering problem (RIC). In RIM, the attacker needs to choose r
facilities to interdict among the p existing facilities to maximize the increase in the weighted
distance. Church and Scaparra [21] extend the previous study of the RIM [19] by adding
a level of fortification decision. This problem is referred to as the r-interdiction median
problem with fortification (RIMF). In the RIMF, the defender wants to protect the network
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by fortifying q facilities to minimize costs in the worst-case scenario when the attacker
destroys r unfortified facilities. Scaparra and Church [77] reformulate the model as a maximal
covering problem with precedence constraints,in which the model can provide lower and
upper bounds to the problem. The bounds are then used to reduce the size of the original
model proposed by Church and Scaparra [21]. Scaparra and Church [76] formulate the RIMF
as a bilevel integer programming model and propose a solution method based on a tree search
implicit enumeration (IE) procedure. Aksen et al. [4] study the fortification problem with a
budget constraint, in which the model determines the optimal number of facilities to fortify
instead of using a predetermined number. They assume there is a capacity expansion cost
when a customer is reassigned to a non-interdicted facility. Liberatore et al. [53] consider
the correlation effects between the facilities and that one attack may affect more than one
facility. The facilities being affected may only lose some of their capacity.
Zhu et al. [96] introduce probabilistic factors into the fortification model by assuming
that an attack is successful only when all defense units allocated in the facility have failed
to intercept it. They propose a model that generalizes the RIMF’s bilevel formulation with
probabilistic factors. However, they do not provide an efficient algorithm to solve the lower
level model, and only brute force enumeration is used to find the solution. Zhang et al. [93]
consider random attacks which may be introduced by misplaced attacks or natural disasters.
Their model requires explicitly enumerating all attack patterns and the number of patterns
grows exponentially; as a result, only the most modest instances can be solved.
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Chapter 3
Efficient Solution Methods for Facility
Location Problems with Random
Disruptions
3.1 Problem Definition and Formulation
Consider the problem of locating facilities from a set of potential locations J = {1, ..., |J |}
to serve a set of customer demand aggregation points I = {1, ..., |I|}. Each customer i ∈ I
faces a demand with rate di. The fixed setup cost to open facility j ∈ J is fj and the unit
shipment cost from facility j ∈ J to customer i ∈ I is cij. Furthermore, if the demand of
customer i ∈ I is not served, a unit penalty cost ci0 is incurred. We assume that ci0 ≥ cij
for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J , i.e., any customer should be served as long as there is an available
facility.
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Facilities are unreliable with unexpected random failures. The random vector ξ˜ =
(ξ˜1, ..., ξ˜|J |)T is adopted to represent the failure status of all facilities, where the random
variable ξ˜j ∈ {0, 1} is 1 if facility j is online and 0 if it is disrupted. The set of all possible
realizations of ξ˜ is denoted by
Ξ :=
{
(ξ1, ..., ξ|J |)T | ξj ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ J
}
= {0, 1}|J |.
For any realization ξ ∈ Ξ, let pξ be the corresponding probability, i.e., pξ := Prob(ξ˜ = ξ).
A distribution of ξ˜ can then be represented by a vector p of pξ for all ξ ∈ Ξ. Note that
p has 2|J | components as the cardinality of Ξ is 2|J |. Due to the high dimensionality, it
is often challenging to determine the distribution p of facility failures. Consequently, we
assume that the distribution is partially characterized by n pieces of information. For any
k ∈ {1, ..., n}, the kth piece of information specifies that the probability of all facilities in
set Ak being online and all facilities in set Bk being disrupted is within the interval [qk, qk],
i.e., Prob(ξ˜j = 1 ∀j ∈ Ak, ξ˜j = 0 ∀j ∈ Bk) ∈ [qk, qk]. Therefore, the distribution p should be
contained in the following set P :
P :=
{
p ∈ [0, 1](2|J|)
∣∣∣∑ξ∈Ξ|ξj=1 ∀j∈Ak,ξj=0 ∀j∈Bk pξ ∈ [qk, qk] ∀k ∈ {1, ..., n}, ∑ξ∈Ξ pξ = 1} .
To the best of our knowledge, the definition of P generalizes the characterization of the
disruption distribution in any existing work. Some special cases are discussed as follows.
• Stochastic model. The case with a completely known distribution p can be viewed as
P being a singleton defined by 2|J | pieces of information. In this case, the problem is
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written as:
min
S⊆J
∑
j∈S
fj + E[Q(S, ξ˜)]. (3.1)
A special case of the problem where the complete information is given by the statement
that disruptions are independent is study by [82, 80, 24, 1].
• Marginal distribution model. P can be characterized by |J | pieces of information, each
of which specifies the marginal probability for a facility to be online. More specifically,
we have Prob(ξ˜j = 1) = qj for any j ∈ J and hence
P =
{
p ∈ [0, 1](2|J|)
∣∣∣∑ξ∈Ξ|ξj=1 pξ = qj ∀j ∈ J, ∑ξ∈Ξ pξ = 1} .
Lu et al. [55] consider the same characterization of the disruption probability.
• Moment model. Note that the κth cross moment of the random variables ξ˜j where
j ∈ {j1, ..., jκ} ⊆ J is Ep[
∏jκ
j=j1
ξ˜j] = Prob(ξ˜j = 1 ∀j ∈ {j1, ..., jκ}). Thus, the set
P can be used to represent the set of distribution specified by the moments of ξ˜. In
particular, suppose that the marginal moment of ξ˜j is qj for any j ∈ J , while the cross
moment of ξ˜j1 and ξ˜j2 for any j1, j2 ∈ J and j1 < j2 is qj1j2 . Then the set P specified
by the first two moments can be written as
P =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
p ∈ [0, 1](2|J|)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
ξ∈Ξ|ξj=1 pξ = qj ∀j ∈ J,∑
ξ∈Ξ|ξj1=ξj2=1 pξ = qj1j2 ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, j1 < j2∑
ξ∈Ξ pξ = 1
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
. (3.2)
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Based on these available information, we would choose a set S ⊆ J of facilities to be set
up to serve the customers. As all the facilities are uncapacitated, any customer should be
served by the closest open facility that is not disrupted. Therefore, given set S of the open
facilities and realization ξ of the disruption status, the transportation and penalty cost to
serve all customers is
Q(S, ξ) =
∑
i∈I
di min
j∈{j∈S|ξj=1}∪{0}
cij,
where the shortage penalty cost ci0 satisfying ci0 ≥ cij for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J is incurred only
when all the open facilities are disrupted. Recall that the disruption status ξ˜ is uncertain.
If its distribution is known, the expectation of Q(S, ξ˜) should be taken into account when
deciding S. However, the distribution of ξ˜ can only be characterized by the set P . Because
this is a strategic decision, a decision maker may want to consider the worst case expectation
of Q(S, ξ˜) among all distributions in the set P , i.e., maxp∈P Ep[Q(S, ξ˜)]. Also note that a
fixed cost fj is charged to set up facility j ∈ J . As a result, an ideal set S of open facilities
should minimize both the fixed setup cost and the worst-case expected transportation and
penalty cost, which leads to the following robust optimization problem:
P : min
S⊆J
∑
j∈S
fj +max
p∈P
Ep[Q(S, ξ˜)]. (3.3)
Obviously, model (3.3) is a NP-hard problem, as it generalizes the UFLP, which is a
well-known NP-hard problem. In order to design efficient algorithms for this problem, we
next study some properties of model (3.3) in the following subsection.
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3.1.1 Model Properties
Supermodularity in discrete optimization is similar to the convexity. Intuitively, it
demonstrates “increasing returns” and has many applications. It is well-known that the
UFLP is equivalent to minimizing a supermodular function [9]. We next show that this
property can be extended to the expected transportation and penalty cost item Ep[Q(S, ξ˜)],
which is written as E(S,p) for brevity, i.e., E(S,p) := Ep[Q(S, ξ˜)].
Firstly, we recall some well-known results of supermodular set functions [see 65,
Chap.III.3.1]. Let U be a finite set and f a real-valued function on the subsets of set
U . Denote ρe(S) := f(S ∪ {e}) − f(S) as the incremental value of adding an element e to
the set S. We have the following definition and properties of supermodular set functions.
Definition 3.1. A set function f is supermodular if one of the following statements is
satisfied,
(1) f(S) + f(T ) ≤ f(S ∩ T ) + f(S ∪ T ), for all S, T ⊆ U ;
(2) ρe(S) ≤ ρe(T ), for all S ⊆ T ⊆ U and e ∈ U \ T .
Lemma 3.2. A positive linear combination of supermodular functions is supermodular.
A set function f is defined as nonincreasing if f(S) ≥ f(T ), for all S ⊆ T . We have the
following property for nonincreasing supermodular set functions.
Lemma 3.3. If f is a nonincreasing supermodular set function, then f(S) ≥ f(T ) +∑
e∈S\T ρe(T ), for all S, T ⊆ U .
Based on the definition and lemmas above, we can prove the supermodularity and
monotonicity of E(S,p).
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Proposition 3.4. Given p, E(S,p) is supermodular and nonincreasing in S.
Proof: We firstly prove that given a fixed ξ, Q(S, ξ) is supermodular and nonincreasing in
S. For each S ⊆ T ⊆ J and e ∈ J \ T ,
Q(S ∪ {e}, ξ)−Q(S, ξ) =
∑
i∈I
di min
j∈{j∈S∪{e}|ξj=1}∪{0}
cij −
∑
i∈I
di min
j∈{j∈S|ξj=1}∪{0}
cij.
If ξe = 0,
Q(S ∪ {e}, ξ)−Q(S, ξ) = Q(T ∪ {e}, ξ)−Q(T, ξ) = 0,
otherwise, i.e., ξe = 1,
Q(S ∪ {e}, ξ)−Q(S, ξ) = ∑i∈I dimin{0, cie −minj∈{j∈S|ξj=1}∪{0} cij}
≤ ∑i∈I dimin{0, cie −minj∈{j∈T |ξj=1}∪{0} cij}
= Q(T ∪ {e}, ξ)−Q(T, ξ).
Therefore Q(S, ξ) is supermodular in S according to Definition 3.1. Furthermore, we have
Q(S ∪ {e}, ξ) ≤ Q(S, ξ), and thus Q(S, ξ) with fixed ξ is nonincreasing and supermodular
in S.
We next consider E(S,p), i.e., the expected transportation and penalty cost. As the
entries of p is finite, E(S,p) can be written as E(S,p) =
∑
ξ∈ΞQ(S, ξ)pξ. Note that pξ is
nonnegative. Thus E(S,p) is supermodular and nonincreasing in S because of Lemma 3.2
and the fact that, a positive linear combination of nonincreasing functions is nonincreasing.
This completes the proof.
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Note that Q(S, ξ) in our problem is essentially the same as h(x, ξ) in [55], in which x
denotes the vector of facility location decisions and ξ denotes the disruption scenario. They
proved that h(x, ξ) is supermodular in S(ξ) = {j ∈ J |ξj = 1}, which is the set of online
facilities depending on the disruption scenario ξ. Different from their work, Proposition 3.4
proves that Q(S, ξ) is supermodular in S, which is the decision, i.e., the set of facilities
decided to open.
We further notice that Proposition 3.4 does not rely on the independence of disruptions.
Therefore, the solution methods developed in next section, which are based on Proposition
3.4, can handle the correlated disruptions as well.
3.2 Solution Methods
In this section, we first derive the cutting plane algorithm framework for solving robust
model (3.3). Since the stochastic model (3.1) is a special case of the robust model (3.3), the
algorithm is readily applicable to solve model (3.1). Then, we propose a multi-start tabu
search algorithm for solving model (3.1).
3.2.1 An Exact Cutting Plane Algorithm
By introducing a continuous variable η to represent the worst-case expected transportation
and penalty cost, we can write model (3.3) as,
P : min
S⊆J
∑
j∈S fj + η
s.t. η ≥ E(S,p), ∀p ∈ P.
(3.4)
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Given p ∈ P , for the nonincreasing and supermodular function E(S,p) in S, we define
ρj(S,p) := E(S ∪{j},p)−E(S,p), representing the incremental value when involving node
j into S, similarly as in Definition 3.1. According to Contreras and Ferna´ndez [22], we have
the following theorem, which can be derived from Lemma 3.3.
Theorem 3.5. Given S ⊆ J and p ∈ P , consider a real number η ∈ R and a set K := {η ∈
R|η ≥ E(T,p) +∑j∈S\T ρj(T,p), ∀T ⊆ J}. Then η ∈ K if and only if η ≥ E(S,p).
Based on Theorem 3.5, model (3.3) can be written as,
P : min
S⊆J
∑
j∈S fj + η (3.5a)
s.t. η ≥ E(T,p) +∑j∈S\T ρj(T,p), ∀T ⊆ J,p ∈ P. (3.5b)
Model (3.5) contains an exponential number of constraints, as constraints (3.5b) should
be satisfied for all the subsets of J and p in P . It is impractical to directly solve even a
problem with moderate size. For example, if |J | = 100, the quantity of all the subsets of J
is 2100 ≈ 1.2676506× 1030.
Fortunately, the cutting plane approach can be applied to efficiently solve this problem.
Generally speaking, to implement the cutting plane approach, we start from solving the
relaxed problem with only a subset of constraints. Then, we identify the violated constraints
by solving the separation problem, and solve the relaxed problem again with these violated
constraints involved. These steps repeat and continue, until no violated constraint is found.
Given S, the separation problem of constraints (3.5b), denoted as Zsep(S), is obtained
by maximizing the right-hand side of constraints (3.5b) over all T ⊆ J and p ∈ P , or
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equivalently, by maximizing the right-hand side of the constraints in model (3.4) over all
p ∈ P , i.e.,
Zsep(S) = max
p∈P,T⊆J
{
E(T,p) +
∑
j∈S\T ρj(T,p)
}
= max
p∈P
max
T⊆J
{
E(T,p) +
∑
j∈S\T ρj(T,p)
}
= max
p∈P
E(S,p),
where the second line comes from the equivalent transformation, and the third line comes
from Lemma 3.3 and Proposition 3.4, or more specifically, as E(S,p) is nonincreasing and
supermodular in S, we have E(S,p) ≥ E(T,p) +∑j∈S\T ρj(T,p), for all T ⊆ J .
The detailed steps of the cutting plane algorithm is as follows.
Step 1 Consider the relaxation of model (3.5), denoted as RP , with only a subset of
constraints (3.5b).
Step 2 Solve RP and obtain the optimal solution (η∗, S∗).
Step 3 Solve the separation problem Zsep(S
∗) = maxp∈P E(S∗,p). Obtain the optimal
solution p∗ and the optimal objective value Z∗sep(S
∗) = E(S∗,p∗). If η∗ < E(S∗,p∗),
add constraint η ≥ E(S∗,p∗) +∑j∈S\S∗ ρj(S∗,p∗) into RP , and then go to Step
2; otherwise, i.e., η∗ ≥ E(S∗,p∗), terminate the algorithm and output the current
solution (η∗, S∗) as the optimal solution for model (3.5).
Note that in Step 3 above, we claim that η∗ ≥ E(S∗,p∗) indicates the optimality of the
current solution (η∗, S∗). This is because
η∗ ≥ E(S∗,p∗) = max
p∈P
E(S∗,p),
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where the equality sign comes from the fact that p∗ is the optimal solution of the separation
problem. Thus we have
η∗ ≥ E(S∗,p), ∀p ∈ P,
i.e., all the constraints in model (3.4) are satisfied, or equivalently, no violated constraint
can be found for the current solution (η∗, S∗), and therefore (η∗, S∗) is optimal.
For this cutting plane algorithm, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.6. The cutting plane algorithm solves model (3.5) to optimality within finite
iterations.
Proof: An upper bound of the number of iterations of the cutting plane algorithm is
the number of J ’s subsets, which is finite, and thus the algorithm terminates within finite
iterations.
Furthermore, as P is a minimization problem, the objective value of RP provides
a lower bound to model (3.3), and any solution (η∗, S∗) to RP always satisfies η∗ ≤
maxp∈P E(S∗,p). In Step 3, when the algorithm terminates with the solution (η∗, S∗),
we have η∗ ≥ maxp∈P E(S∗,p). Thus η∗ = maxp∈P E(S∗,p), and an optimal solution is
obtained when the algorithm terminates.
Remark: The cutting plane procedure can be implemented using the lazy constraint
callback provided by CPLEX. The solver automatically checks if there exists any super-
modular constraints that are violated, when an integer solution has been identified. This
implementation automatically takes the advantage of a warm start. In our preliminary
computational experiment, it speeds up the solution time by about several times when
compared to the procedure without lazy constraint callback.
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The relaxed problem RP in Step 2 of the cutting plane algorithm is a mixed integer
programming with moderate number of constraints, thus RP can be solved efficiently by
commercial solver like CPLEX. However, because the distribution set P is generally defined,
in some cases the separation problem Zsep(S
∗) in Step 3 of the cutting plane algorithm could
be a linear programming problem with exponential number of decision variables, which is
not an easy problem to be solved. In the following subsection 3.2.1, we will discuss the
approach to solve this separation problem, and the detailed algorithmic steps to formulate
the supermodular cut η ≥ E(S∗,p∗) +∑j∈S\S∗ ρj(S∗,p∗) are presented in subsection 3.2.1.
Solving the Separation Problem
Because the separation problem Zsep(S) contains exponential number of variables, we next
apply the column generation approach to solve it efficiently.
With the general definition of P , the separation problem Zsep(S) = maxp∈P E(S,p) can
be written as,
Zsep(S) = max
pξ≥0
∑
ξ∈ΞQ(S, ξ)pξ
s.t.
∑
ξ∈Ξ pξ = 1,∑
ξ∈Ξ|ξj=1 ∀j∈Ak,ξj=0 ∀j∈Bk pξ ≤ qk, ∀k = 1, ..., n,
−∑ξ∈Ξ|ξj=1 ∀j∈Ak,ξj=0 ∀j∈Bk pξ ≤ −qk, ∀k = 1, ..., n,
(3.6)
where the constraints are from the definition of P . Define the dual variables of the constraints
in model (3.6) respectively as α, βk and βk for all k = 1, ..., n, and then the dual problem of
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model (3.6) is as follows,
ZDsep(S) = min
α,β,β
α +
∑n
k=1(qkβk − qkβk)
s.t. α +
∑
k∈{1,...,n}|ξj=1 ∀j∈Ak,ξj=0 ∀j∈Bk(βk − βk) ≥ Q(S, ξ), ∀ξ ∈ Ξ,
βk ≥ 0, βk ≥ 0, ∀k = 1, ..., n,
where β and β are respectively the vectors of βk and βk. The corresponding pricing problem
(also known as the reduce cost), denoted as RC(S), is as follows,
RC(S) = max
ξ∈Ξ
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩Q(S, ξ)− α−
∑
k∈{1,...,n}|
ξj=1 ∀j∈Ak,ξj=0 ∀j∈Bk
(βk − βk)
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ .
Substitute Q(S, ξ) and conduct equivalent reformulation, then RC(S) can be further written
as,
RC(S) = max
ξ∈Ξ
{∑
i∈I
di min
j∈{j∈S|ξj=1}∪{0}
cij − α−
n∑
k=1
(βk − βk)
∏
j∈Ak
ξj
∏
j′∈Bk
(1− ξj′)
}
. (3.7)
For example, given P in (3.2), which is defined by the first two moments of ξ˜, the
corresponding pricing problem to solve the separation problem is
RC(S) = max
ξ∈Ξ
{∑
i∈I
di min
j∈{j∈S|ξj=1}∪{0}
cij − α−
∑
j∈J
βjξj −
∑
j1,j2∈J,j1<j2
βj1j2ξj1ξj2
}
. (3.8)
Here, βj and βj1j2 are the dual variables corresponding to the first and second moments
constraints, i.e., the first two constraints in (3.2), respectively.
For the pricing problem RC(S), we have the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.7. Model (3.7) is NP-hard.
Proof: Consider model (3.8), which is a special case of model (3.7). It is sufficient to show
that the weighted MAX CUT problem, a well-known NP-hard problem, can be reduced to
model (3.8) in polynomial time.
The weighted MAX CUT problem is formally defined as follows: Given a simple graph
G = (V,E) and a weight wij ∈ Z+ for each edge (i, j) ∈ E, partition V into disjoint sets V1
and V2 such that the sum of the weights of the edges between V1 and V2 is maximized. Let
wij = 0 for any (i, j) /∈ E. It can be formulated as
max
yi∈{−1,1}
{
1
4
∑
i,j∈V,i =j
wij(1− yiyj)
}
,
where yi = 1 if i ∈ V1 and yi = −1 if i ∈ V2.
Consider an instance of model (3.8) where cij = ci0 for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J . Set
βj2j1 := βj1j2 for all j1, j2 ∈ J such that j1 < j2. Model (3.8) can be written as
RC(S) = max
ξj∈{0,1}
{∑
i∈I
dici0 − α−
∑
j∈J
βjξj − 1
2
∑
j1,j2∈J,j1 =j2
βj1j2ξj1ξj2
}
.
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Define a new decision variable xj := 2ξj − 1, i.e., ξj = (xj + 1)/2 for any j ∈ J . We have
xj ∈ {−1, 1} for all j ∈ J and
RC(S) = max
xj∈{−1,1}
{∑
i∈I
dici0 − α−
∑
j∈J
βj · xj + 1
2
− 1
2
∑
j1,j2∈J,j1 =j2
βj1j2 ·
xj1 + 1
2
· xj2 + 1
2
}
= max
xj∈{−1,1}
{(∑
i∈I
dici0 − α− 1
2
∑
j∈J
βj − 1
8
∑
j1,j2∈J,j1 =j2
βj1j2
)
−
∑
j∈J
(
1
2
βj +
1
4
∑
j′∈J,j′ =j
βjj′
)
· xj −
∑
j1,j2∈J,j1 =j2
1
8
βj1j2xj1xj2
}
.
Suppose that J = V and
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
8
βj1j2 =
1
4
wj1j2 , ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, j1 = j2,
1
2
βj +
1
4
∑
j′∈J,j′ =j
βjj′ = 0, ∀j ∈ J,
∑
i∈I
dici0 − α− 1
2
∑
j∈J
βj − 1
8
∑
j1,j2∈J,j1 =j2
βj1j2 =
1
4
∑
j1,j2∈J,j1 =j2
wj1j2 ,
i.e.,
βj1j2 = 2wj1j2 ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, j1 = j2, βj = −
∑
j′∈J,j′ =j
wjj′ ∀j ∈ J, α =
∑
i∈I
dici0.
It is straightforward that this specific instance of RC(S) is equivalent the weighted MAX
CUT problem.
To implement the column generation approach, the pricing problem need to be solved for
many times in order to identify effective columns, or decision variables, thus the efficiency
of solving the pricing problem has a significant impact on the efficiency of the whole
algorithm. Although the pricing problem (3.7) is proved to be NP-hard, indicating that no
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polynomial algorithm exists for it, we can instead reformulate it into an equivalent integer
programming with moderate number of decision variables and constraints, which can be
solved satisfactorily by commercial solvers like CPLEX. The equivalent reformulation is
presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.8. Let Ak = {a1k, ..., a|Ak|k } and Bk = {b1k, ..., b|Bk|k } for any k ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Then model (3.7) is equivalent to
RC(S) = max
ξ∈Ξ,
π,λ,μ,ν
∑
i∈I
diπi − α−
∑
k∈K
(βk − βk)λk +
∑
k∈K⊕
(βk − βk)
⎛⎝−1 + |Ak|∑
m=1
μmk +
|Bk|∑
m=1
νmk
⎞⎠
s.t. πi ≤ cijξj + ci0(1− ξj), ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ S,
λk ≤ ξj, ∀k ∈ K	, j ∈ Ak,
λk ≤ 1− ξj, ∀k ∈ K	, j ∈ Bk,
μmk ≤ ξj, ∀k ∈ K⊕,m ∈ {2, ..., |Ak|}, j ∈ {a1k, ..., am−1k },
μmk ≤ 1− ξamk , ∀k ∈ K⊕,m ∈ {1, ..., |Ak|},
νmk ≤ 1− ξj, ∀k ∈ K⊕,m ∈ {2, ..., |Bk|}, j ∈ {b1k, ..., bm−1k },
νmk ≤ ξj, ∀k ∈ K⊕,m ∈ {1, ..., |Bk|}, j ∈ Ak ∪ {bmk },
(3.9)
where π, λ, μ and ν are respectively the vectors of πi, λk, μ
m
k and ν
m
k ,
K	 := {k ∈ {1, ..., n} | βk − βk < 0} and K⊕ := {k ∈ {1, ..., n} | βk − βk > 0}.
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Proof: Let πi represent the term minj∈{j∈S|ξj=1}∪{0} cij for any i ∈ I. We can write model
(3.7) as
RC(S) = max
ξ∈Ξ,π
∑
i∈I diπi − α−
∑n
k=1(βk − βk)
∏
j∈Ak ξj
∏
j′∈Bk(1− ξj′)
s.t. πi ≤ cijξj + ci0(1− ξj), ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ S.
Consider the term −(βk − βk)
∏
j∈Ak ξj
∏
j′∈Bk(1 − ξj′) for any k ∈ {1, ..., n} in the
objective function.
Case 1: Suppose that βk−βk < 0, i.e., k ∈ K	. We can introduce a new decision variable
λk to represent
∏
j∈Ak ξj
∏
j′∈Bk(1− ξj′). Then the term −(βk − βk)
∏
j∈Ak ξj
∏
j′∈Bk(1− ξj′)
can be replaced with −(βk − βk)λk by adding the constraints
λk ≤ ξj, ∀j ∈ Ak and λk ≤ 1− ξj, ∀j ∈ Bk.
Case 2: Suppose that βk − βk > 0, i.e., k ∈ K⊕. Note that
−
∏
j∈Ak
ξj = −
a
|Ak|−1
k∏
j=a1k
ξj
(
1− (1− ξ
a
|Ak|
k
)
)
= −
a
|Ak|−1
k∏
j=a1k
ξj +
a
|Ak|−1
k∏
j=a1k
ξj(1− ξa|Ak|k ) = · · ·
= − ξa1k + ξa1k(1− ξa2k) + · · ·+
a
|Ak|−1
k∏
j=a1k
ξj(1− ξa|Ak|k ) = −1 + (1− ξa1k) +
|Ak|∑
m=2
am−1k∏
j=a1k
ξj(1− ξamk )
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and
−
∏
j′∈Bk
(1− ξj′) = −
b
|Bk|−1
k∏
j′=b1k
(1− ξj′)(1− ξb|Bk|k ) = −
b
|Bk|−1
k∏
j′=b1k
(1− ξj′) +
b
|Bk|−1
k∏
j′=b1k
(1− ξj′)ξb|Bk|k = · · ·
= − 1 + ξb1k + (1− ξb1k)ξb2k + · · ·+
b
|Bk|−1
k∏
j′=b1k
(1− ξj′)ξb|Bk|k = −1 + ξb1k +
|Bk|∑
m=2
bm−1k∏
j′=b1k
(1− ξj′)ξbmk ,
which yields
−
∏
j∈Ak
ξj
∏
j′∈Bk
(1− ξj′) = −
∏
j∈Ak
ξj +
∏
j∈Ak
ξjξb1k +
|Bk|∑
m=2
∏
j∈Ak
ξj
bm−1k∏
j′=b1k
(1− ξj′)ξbmk
= − 1 + (1− ξa1k) +
|Ak|∑
m=2
am−1k∏
j=a1k
ξj(1− ξamk ) +
∏
j∈Ak
ξjξb1k +
|Bk|∑
m=2
∏
j∈Ak
ξj
bm−1k∏
j′=b1k
(1− ξj′)ξbmk .
Define the new decision variables μ1k, μ
m
k for any m = 2, ..., |Ak|, ν1k , and νmk for any m =
2, ..., |Bk|, which represent the terms
1− ξa1k ,
am−1k∏
j=a1k
ξj(1− ξamk ),
∏
j∈Ak
ξjξb1k , and
∏
j∈Ak
ξj
bm−1k∏
j′=b1k
(1− ξj′)ξbmk ,
respectively. Under the constraints
μmk ≤ ξj, ∀m ∈ {2, ..., |Ak|}, j ∈ {a1k, ..., am−1k },
μmk ≤ 1− ξamk , ∀m ∈ {1, ..., |Ak|},
νmk ≤ 1− ξj, ∀m ∈ {2, ..., |Bk|}, j ∈ {b1k, ..., bm−1k },
νmk ≤ ξj, ∀m ∈ {1, ..., |Bk|}, j ∈ Ak ∪ {bmk },
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we can replace the term −(βk − βk)
∏
j∈Ak ξj
∏
j′∈Bk(1− ξj′) in the objective function with
(βk − βk)
⎛⎝−1 + |Ak|∑
m=1
μmk +
|Bk|∑
m=1
νmk
⎞⎠ .
Proposition 3.8 reformulates the pricing problem RC(S) in (3.7) as the linear integer
program in (3.9), which is ready to be solved by any commercial IP solver, e.g., CPLEX.
Although model (3.9) has more decision variables and constraints than model (3.7), its
numbers of variables and constraints are
|J |+ |I|+ |K	|+
∑
k∈K⊕
|Ak|+
∑
k∈K⊕
|Bk| ≤ |I|+ |J |+
n∑
k=1
(|Ak|+ |Bk|) ≤ |I|+ (n+ 1)|J |
and
|I||S|+
∑
k∈K
|Ak|+
∑
k∈K
|Bk|+
∑
k∈K⊕
|Ak|∑
m=2
(m− 1) +
∑
k∈K⊕
|Ak|+
∑
k∈K⊕
|Bk|∑
m=2
(m− 1)
+
∑
k∈K⊕
|Bk|∑
m=1
(|Ak|+ 1)
≤ |I||J |+
n∑
k=1
|Ak|∑
m=2
(m− 1) +
n∑
k=1
|Ak|+
n∑
k=1
|Bk|∑
m=2
(m− 1) +
n∑
k=1
|Bk|∑
m=1
(|Ak|+ 1)
= |I||J |+
n∑
k=1
1
2
|Ak|(|Ak| − 1) +
n∑
k=1
|Ak|+
n∑
k=1
1
2
|Bk|(|Bk| − 1) +
n∑
k=1
(|Ak|+ 1)|Bk|
= |I||J |+
n∑
k=1
1
2
(
|Ak|2 − |Ak|+ 2|Ak|+ |Bk|2 − |Bk|+ 2|Ak||Bk|+ 2|Bk|
)
= |I||J |+
n∑
k=1
1
2
(
|Ak|2 + 2|Ak||Bk|+ |Bk|2 + |Ak|+ |Bk|
)
= |I||J |+
n∑
k=1
1
2
(|Ak|+ |Bk|+ 1)(|Ak|+ |Bk|) ≤ |I||J |+ n
2
|J |(|J |+ 1)
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respectively, and hence are still polynomial in the input size, i.e., |I|, |J | and n.
As an illustration of Proposition 3.8, we consider P in (3.2), which is defined by the first
two moments of ξ˜. The corresponding RC(S) in (3.8) can be reformulated as
RC(S) = max
ξ∈Ξ,
π,λ,μ
∑
i∈I
diπi − α−
∑
j∈J
βjξj −
∑
j1,j2∈J,j1<j2,
βj1j2<0
βj1j2λj1j2 +
∑
j1,j2∈J,j1<j2,
βj1j2>0
βj1j2 (−ξj1 + μj1j2)
s.t. πi ≤ cijξj + ci0(1− ξj), ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ S,
λj1j2 ≤ ξj1 , ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, j1 < j2, βj1j2 < 0,
λj1j2 ≤ ξj2 , ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, j1 < j2, βj1j2 < 0,
μj1j2 ≤ 1− ξj2 , ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, j1 < j2, βj1j2 > 0,
μj1j2 ≤ ξj1 , ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, j1 < j2, βj1j2 > 0.
(3.10)
Note, for this special case, there exists a simplified formula as follows
RC(S) = max
ξ∈Ξ,
π,λ
∑
i∈I
diπi − α−
∑
j∈J
βjξj −
∑
j1,j2∈J,j1<j2
βj1j2λj1j2
s.t. πi ≤ cijξj + ci0(1− ξj), ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ S,
λj1j2 ≤ ξj1 , ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, j1 < j2,
λj1j2 ≤ ξj2 , ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, j1 < j2,
λj1j2 ≥ ξj1 + ξj2 − 1, ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, j1 < j2.
(3.11)
On Generating Initial Columns
Column generation algorithm starts with a group of initial columns such that the restricted
master problem is feasible. For some problems, it is straightforward to find such columns.
For example, one can use a set of all singletons as initial columns for a set covering problem.
However, for this problem, it is difficult to directly construct a feasible set of columns except
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for some special cases, such as the marginal model, see [55]. Actually, if P is not properly
given, it may happen that no distribution can satisfy P . Next, we show a method to
generate initial columns or prove such columns not exist by using the cross moment model
as an example, i.e., P is given by (3.2). This method adopts the same idea of two phase
simplex method.
The separation problem Zsep(S) for the cross moment model can be rewritten as,
Zsep(S) = max
pξ≥0
∑
ξ∈ΞQ(S, ξ)pξ
s.t.
∑
ξ∈Ξ pξ = 1,∑
ξ∈Ξ|ξj=1 pξ = qj ∀j ∈ J,∑
ξ∈Ξ|ξj1=ξj2=1 pξ = qj1j2 ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, j1 < j2.
(3.12)
We construct a first phase master problem, which considers an arbitrary subset of columns
as follows
MP = min
pξ≥0,
α‡≥0,β‡≥0,
α‡ +
∑
j∈J |ξj=1 β
‡
j +
∑
j1,j2∈J |j1<j2,ξj1=ξj2=1 β
‡
j1j2
s.t.
∑
ξ∈Ξˆ pξ + α
‡ = 1,∑
ξ∈Ξˆ|ξj=1 pξ + β
‡
j = qj ∀j ∈ J,∑
ξ∈Ξˆ|ξj1=ξj2=1 pξ + β
‡
j1j2
= qj1j2 ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, j1 < j2,
(3.13)
where α‡, β‡j and β
‡
j1j2
are nonnegative artificial variables corresponding to each constraint
of the model.
There are two cases when solving MP:
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(i) MP = 0, and we find a set of initial columns.
(ii) MP > 0. Then we solve pricing problem W , which can be written as:
W = min
ξ∈Ξ
⎧⎨⎩α† + ∑
j∈J |ξj=1
β†j +
∑
j1,j2∈J |j1<j2,ξj1=ξj2=1
β†j1j2
⎫⎬⎭ ,
, where α†, β†j and β
†
j1j2
represent the corresponding duals obtained by solving MP. Similar
to (3.11), W can be solved by following integer programming model:
W = min
ξ,λ
α† +
∑
j∈J β
†
jξj +
∑
j1,j2∈J,j1<j2 β
†
j1j2
λj1j2
λj1j2 ≤ ξj1 , ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, j1 < j2,
λj1j2 ≤ ξj2 , ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, j1 < j2,
λj1j2 ≥ ξj1 + ξj2 − 1, ∀j1, j2 ∈ J, j1 < j2,
(3.14)
If W < 0, we add corresponding column to MP, and repeat the process. If W ≥ 0,
then the problem Zsep(S) is infeasible for any S.
Formulating the Supermodular Cut
Suppose that S∗ and p∗ are given. The corresponding cut η ≥ E(S∗,p∗)+∑j∈S\S∗ ρj(S∗,p∗)
can be constructed by Algorithm 1, in which variables cost and cost(j) respectively denote
E(S∗,p∗) and E(S∗ ∪ {j},p∗). As the number of non-zero items in p∗ is O(n), the
computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n|I||J |).
For some special cases with further assumptions about the disruption probabilities,
such that the conditional disruption probabilities can be calculated in O(1) whereas n is
significantly larger than |J |, we propose a more efficient Algorithm 2. Several examples fall
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Algorithm 1 Construct a supermodular cut corresponding to S∗ and p∗
Input: A set of facilities S∗ and a disruption distribution p∗.
Output: A supermodular cut, i.e., η ≥ E(S∗,p∗) +∑j∈S\S∗ ρj(S∗,p∗)
1: cost ← 0, cost(j) ← 0 for all j ∈ J \ S∗
2: for each ξ ∈ Ξ such that p∗ξ > 0 do
3: Q ← 0, Q(j) ← 0 for all j ∈ J \ S∗
4: for each i ∈ I do
5: cmin ← ci0
6: for each j ∈ S∗ such that ξj = 1 do
7: cmin ← min{cmin, cij}
8: end for
9: Q ← Q+ dicmin
10: for each j ∈ J \ S∗ do
11: if ξj = 1 then
12: Q(j) ← Q(j) + dimin{cmin, cij}
13: else
14: Q(j) ← Q(j) + dicmin
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: cost ← cost+ p∗ξQ, cost(j) ← cost(j) + p∗ξQ(j) for all j ∈ J \ S∗
19: end for
20: return the supermodular cut η ≥ cost+∑j∈S\S∗(cost(j)− cost)
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into this category, including the case in which ξ˜j for all j ∈ J are independently distributed
as assumed in [1], and the case in which the correlations of disruptions are induced from
shared hazard exposure and follow certain known pattern as assumed in [51].
In Algorithm 2, variable γ denotes the joint disruption probability of facilities j1, ..., jt,
that is, Prob(ξj1 = 0, ..., ξjt = 0). Step A of Algorithm 2 is to sort a list of at most
|J | facilities for |I| times; therefore, Step A runs in O(|I||J | log |J |). Furthermore, if the
conditional probability Prob(ξjt = 0|ξj1 = 0, ..., ξjt−1 = 0) can be obtained in O(1), Step B
and Step C of Algorithm 2 both run in O(|J |). Thus Lines 5-11 run in O(|I||J |), and Lines
12-22 run in O(|I||J |2). In summary, Algorithm 2 runs in O(|I||J | log |J |+ |I||J |+ |I||J |2),
which is in the order of O(|I||J |2), and Algorithm 2 is more efficient than Algorithm 1.
3.2.2 A Multi-Start Tabu Search Algorithm
For RFLP, i.e., problem (3.1), although the cutting plane algorithm is able to find the
optimal solution of the problem, the computational time grows tremendously with the size
of the problem. This motivates us to develop an efficient heuristic algorithm in order to find
high quality solutions for large scale problem within an acceptable amount of time.
Tabu search algorithm [36, 37], as an efficient method to solve combinatorial optimization
problem, has been shown to be very successful on solving discrete location problems [5, 85,
62, 86, 30, 41]. The general idea of the tabu search algorithm is: Based on a current solution,
search its neighbors, and determine the best one among all the neighbors as the candidate
solution (and also as the current solution) with the consideration of tabu list and aspiration
criterion. Update the tabu list by adding the candidate solution and removing some other
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Algorithm 2 Construct a supermodular cut corresponding to S∗ and p∗
Input: A set of facilities S∗ and a disruption distribution p∗.
Output: A supermodular cut, i.e., η ≥ E(S∗,p∗) +∑j∈S\S∗ ρj(S∗,p∗)
1: for each customer i ∈ I do  Step A (Lines 1-3)
2: Sort facilities j ∈ S∗ and the emergency facility j = 0 in the nondecreasing order of
their distances to customer i. Let Li = {j1, ..., j|S∗|+1} be the list of indexes of facilities
satisfying cij1 ≤ ... ≤ cij|S∗|+1 .
3: end for
4: cost ← 0, cost(j) ← 0 for all j ∈ J\S∗
5: for each customer i ∈ I do
6: γ ← 1
7: for jt ∈ Li, i.e.,t = 1, ..., |S∗|+ 1 do  Step B (Lines 7-10)
8: cost ← cost+ γ × (1− Prob(ξjt = 0|ξj1 = 0, ..., ξjt−1 = 0))× dicijt
9: γ ← γ × Prob(ξjt = 0|ξj1 = 0, ..., ξjt−1 = 0)
10: end for
11: end for
12: for each j ∈ J\S∗ do
13: for each customer i ∈ I do
14: γ ← 1
15: Insert j into the sorted list Li
16: for jt ∈ Li, i.e.,t = 1, ..., |S∗|+ 2 do  Step C (Lines 16-19)
17: cost(j) ← cost(j) + γ × (1− Prob(ξjt = 0|ξj1 = 0, ..., ξjt−1 = 0))× dicijt
18: γ ← γ × Prob(ξjt = 0|ξj1 = 0, ..., ξjt−1 = 0)
19: end for
20: Remove j from the sorted list Li
21: end for
22: end for
23: return the supermodular cut η ≥ cost+∑j∈S\S∗(cost(j)− cost)
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ones according to specified rules. If the candidate solution outperforms the currently-known
best solution, update the best solution with the candidate solution. Repeat and continue
the steps above until the stopping criteria is satisfied.
In this subsection, we design an efficient multi-start tabu search (MSTS) algorithm based
on Michel and Van Hentenryck [62] to solve the large scale instances of the RFLP. The details
of the MSTS algorithm are explained as follows.
Neighbors For a current solution S, we define the neighbors of S by simply flipping the
status of one facility. Let Sj be the neighbor of S obtained by flipping the status of facility
j, then we have Ij∈Sj = 1 − Ij∈S and Ik∈Sj = Ik∈S for all k = j, where Ij∈S ∈ {0, 1} is the
indicator of whether facility j belongs to S. The set of all the neighbors of S can be written
as {S1, ..., SJ}. It is shown through numerical experiments that the MSTS algorithm with
this simple definition of neighbors can perform quite satisfactorily.
Tabu list The candidate solution is the best one among the neighbors of the current
solution, as long as this best neighbor is not prohibited by the tabu list. The tabu list
is built and updated to avoid revisiting to exploited solutions. Let it be the counter of
iterations. We use tj for all j ∈ J to implement the tabu list, which specifies the iteration
number to which the status of facility j cannot be flipped, i.e., given current solution as S,
its neighbor Sj cannot be selected as candidate solution if it ≤ tj. When the neighbor Sj
is selected as candidate solution, tj is updated as tj = it + tLen, where tLen is an integer
keeping track of the length of the tabu list. We follow [62] and use a simple dynamic tabu
list length scheme to update tLen.
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Aspiration criterion We also employ the aspiration criterion to override a solution’s
tabu state.Recall that the tabu list prohibits some neighbors from being candidate solution,
and the candidate solution is selected from the non-prohibited neighbors. The aspiration
criterion we adopt is: even one neighbor is prohibited by the tabu list, we could still select it
as candidate solution, as long as this solution outperforms the currently-known best solution.
This simple criterion is commonly used, and performs well in our algorithm.
Stopping criterion We stop the algorithm when the currently-known best solution has
not been improved for StabilityLimit number of iterations. With larger StabilityLimit, the
algorithm is able to overcome more local optimal solution, however with the tradeoff being
longer computational time. StabilityLimit is an important parameter to be tuned in the
tabu search algorithm, and we discuss the tuning of this parameter in detail in Appendix-A.
Multi-start technique Unlike most existing tabu search algorithms, which run with
only one initial solution, we apply the multi-start technique in this algorithm by executing
the tabu search process above for nStarts times with different randomly generated initial
solutions. This multi-start technique has been shown to be very successful in combining with
meta-heuristic algorithms [57, 74, 61]. nStarts is an important parameter for the MSTS
algorithm, and we will introduce the detailed parameter tuning process for it in appendix.
The overview of the MSTS algorithm is shown in Figure 3.1,
and its pseudo-code is shown in Algorithm 3.
In Algorithm 3, we use S to store the current solution, Sj† and Obj
† to store the candidate
solution and its objective value, and S∗ and Obj∗ to store the best solution and the best
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Figure 3.1: Flowchart of the multi-start tabu search
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Algorithm 3 MSTS Algorithm
Output: The optimal solution S∗ and the optimal objective value
1: nS ← 0
2: while nS < nStarts do
3: Initialize S, Obj† ← Obj(S), and Obj∗ ← Obj(S) if nS = 0  Initialization
4: ns ← 0, it ← 0, and tj ← 0 for all j ∈ J
5: while ns < StabilityLimit do
6: it ← it+ 1
7: for each facility j ∈ J do
8: if it > tj and Obj(Sj) < Obj
† then  Tabu list
9: Obj† ← Obj(Sj)
10: else if it ≤ tj and Obj(Sj) < Obj∗ then  Aspiration criterion
11: Obj† ← Obj(Sj)
12: end if
13: end for
14: j† ← random{j ∈ J |Obj(Sj) = Obj†}, S ← Sj†  Update the candidate and the current
solutions
15: tj† ← it+ tLen  Update the tabu list
16: Dynamic tabu list length scheme
17: if Obj† < Obj∗ then
18: ns ← 0
19: S∗ ← Sj† , Obj∗ ← Obj†
20: else
21: ns ← ns+ 1
22: end if
23: end while
24: nS ← nS + 1
25: end while
26: return S∗ as optimal solution and Obj∗ as optimal objective value
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objective value known so far. Obj(S) is the function to calculate the objective value of model
(3.1) for a given S.
3.3 Computational Studies
In this section, we apply the proposed algorithms, i.e., the cutting plane algorithm and the
MSTS algorithm, to solve the robust RFLP, and demonstrate their advantages by comparing
them with several existing algorithms.
All of the computational experiments are coded with C++, and implemented using
ILOG CPLEX Academic Initiative Edition 12.6 (64-bit) in single thread model, on a Dell
OptiPlex 9010 with one Intel 3.40 GHz CPU and 4G memory running Unix Operation System
unless otherwise noted. For the cutting plane algorithm, the supermodular constraints are
implemented as lazy constraints.
3.3.1 Results of Cutting Plane Algorithm
We first test the performance of the cutting plane algorithm for three categories of instances:
(i) We begin with instances with fully known distributions. First, we test instances with
independent disruptions, and we compare the cutting plane algorithm with the algorithm
proposed by [1], which to our knowledge is the best known algorithm for the problem with
independent disruptions. Then, we apply the proposed algorithm to solve two types of
instances with correlated disruptions.
(ii) For instances with marginal disruption probabilities, we firstly apply the worst-case
distribution proved by [55] to model (3.3), then solve the worst-case problem using the
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cutting plane algorithm, and finally compare the results with those of [55], which is obtained
using the Benders decomposition algorithm.
(iii) For instances with cross moment of disruption probabilities, as there is no existing
comparable algorithm, we solve the problem using the cutting plane algorithm directly
without any comparison.
Instances with Independent Disruptions
For the instances with independent disruptions, we compare the cutting plane algorithm with
the search-and-cut (SnC) algorithm proposed by Aboolian et al. [1]. Note that when the
disruptions are independent and the disruption probability of each facility is given, model
(3.3) turns into its special case with set P being a singleton, containing a single known
distribution.
The computation is conducted based on the same data sets used in Aboolian et al. [1],
which are from 1990 census data. In these data sets, each node represents a potential
facility location and an aggregated demand point. We compare the performance of the two
algorithms on instances with 50, 75, and 100 nodes, each representing one of the 50, 75, or
100 largest cities in the U.S. The demand, the fixed facility setup cost, and the transportation
cost are the same as in Aboolian et al. [1] based on the data sets. As assumed in [1], the
facility disruptions occur independently, and the disruption probabilities qj are given as
qj = 0.01+0.1αe
−Dj/400, where Dj is the great circle distance (in miles) between node j and
New Orleans (Dj corresponds to dj in [1], and we change the notation to avoid confusion). For
each number of nodes, α varies from 1.0 to 1.5 in 0.05 increments giving total 33 instances.
For the SnC algorithm, we fix the maximum assignment level R to the number of nodes
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so that its objective values are comparable with ours. The neighborhood size is set to 3
to achieve the best performance according to their computational results (please refer to
Aboolian et al. [1] for details). Both algorithms are solved to a 0.5% optimality gap or a
maximum CPU time of 3600 seconds, whichever occurs first.
The computational results are summarized in Table 3.1. The first two columns identify
the instance with the number of nodes and the value of α. The middle three columns show the
results of the SnC algorithm and the last four columns show the results of the cutting plane
algorithm. For each instance, we report the objective value provided by the SnC algorithm
in the column titled “Obj” under the name “SnC Algorithm”, and report the difference of
the objective values between these two algorithms in the column titled “ΔObj” under the
name “Cutting Plane Algorithm”. In the column titled “Gap (%)” for both algorithms, we
report the optimality gap, which is the relative gap between the lower and upper bounds
when the corresponding algorithm terminates. For the cutting plane algorithm we proposed,
the lower bound is the solution of the relaxed master problem, and the upper bound is the
best feasible solution. For the SnC algorithm, the lower and upper bounds are designed by
[1]. In short, the lower bound is obtained by solving a specific mixed integer programming
problem, and the upper bound is obtained by implementing a neighborhood search starting
from the current lower bound.
In addition, we report the CPU time (in seconds) in the column titled “CPU Time”, and
specially for the cutting plane algorithm we report the number of cuts added in the column
titled “#Cuts”.
From Table 3.1, we observe that both algorithms find solutions with the same objective
values for all instances, i.e., the values of ΔObj are zero for all instances, but the cutting
48
Table 3.1: Results for cutting plane algorithm - Independent disruptions
Instance SnC Algorithm Cutting Plane Algorithm
Nodes α Obj Gap(%) CPU Time #Cuts ΔObj Gap(%) CPU Time
50 1 1,020,180 0.38 47.62 203 0 0.36 1.73
50 1.05 1,021,040 0.50 48.23 210 0 0.00 1.33
50 1.1 1,021,890 0.46 57.49 206 0 0.02 2.18
50 1.15 1,022,750 0.49 69.86 194 0 0.13 1.91
50 1.2 1,023,610 0.47 76.52 214 0 0.28 1.65
50 1.25 1,024,470 0.47 83.27 201 0 0.00 1.72
50 1.3 1,025,330 0.48 96.34 212 0 0.50 1.85
50 1.35 1,026,180 0.48 106.80 241 0 0.00 2.13
50 1.4 1,026,980 0.49 133.95 226 0 0.49 1.68
50 1.45 1,027,780 0.40 160.20 272 0 0.00 2.45
50 1.5 1,028,490 0.49 165.61 231 0 0.33 2.10
75 1 1,148,490 0.41 216.09 389 0 0.00 14.16
75 1.05 1,149,490 0.42 240.59 303 0 0.00 13.39
75 1.1 1,150,490 0.47 251.72 309 0 0.00 11.47
75 1.15 1,151,490 0.46 310.70 318 0 0.00 11.07
75 1.2 1,152,500 0.49 387.15 333 0 0.00 15.28
75 1.25 1,153,500 0.44 473.07 389 0 0.00 14.30
75 1.3 1,154,510 0.43 551.13 407 0 0.00 19.05
75 1.35 1,155,520 0.50 600.89 395 0 0.00 22.85
75 1.4 1,156,520 0.49 731.02 373 0 0.00 23.15
75 1.45 1,157,530 0.50 990.51 392 0 0.47 20.05
75 1.5 1,158,540 0.50 1174.16 363 0 0.00 17.46
100 1 1,252,600 0.58 3678.63 832 0 0.44 207.05
100 1.05 1,253,600 0.73 3606.84 809 0 0.49 167.93
100 1.1 1,254,600 0.86 3604.15 917 0 0.42 244.51
100 1.15 1,255,610 0.98 3619.92 898 0 0.45 244.72
100 1.2 1,256,610 1.11 3657.92 805 0 0.48 204.52
100 1.25 1,257,620 1.25 3645.43 997 0 0.41 304.33
100 1.3 1,258,630 1.39 3625.49 896 0 0.41 207.29
100 1.35 1,259,640 1.51 3669.57 870 0 0.44 233.32
100 1.4 1,260,650 1.63 3687.87 937 0 0.50 242.25
100 1.45 1,261,660 1.77 3625.88 972 0 0.50 325.62
100 1.5 1,262,670 1.90 3600.57 1029 0 0.43 363.55
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plane algorithm significantly outperforms the SnC algorithm in computational time. For
example, for the instance with 50 nodes and α = 1, the cutting plane algorithm solves the
instance 27 times faster than the SnC algorithm. For other instances with 50 or 75 nodes
which can be solved by the SnC algorithm appropriately (i.e., to an optimality gap of 0.5%
within 3600 seconds), the cutting plane algorithm runs about 15-80 times faster than the
SnC algorithm. For the instances with 100 nodes, the SnC algorithm fails to reduce the
optimality gap to 0.5% within 3600 seconds, while the cutting plane algorithm is still able
to solve these instances within around 6 minutes.
As previously discussed in subsection 3.2.1, there are theoretically an exponential number
of cuts in the cutting plane algorithm. However, from the column titled “#Cuts” in Table
3.1, we observe that only a very small portion of them are needed, and the number of cuts
needed increases moderately with the problem size. It is further observed that the efficiency
of the SnC algorithm is sensitive to the value of α, as the CPU time increases acutely with
the value of α. For example, for the instances with 50 nodes, as the value of α increases from
1 to 1.5, the CPU time of the SnC algorithm increases from 51.25 seconds to 160.95 seconds.
This observation is consistent with those in Aboolian et al. [1]. In contrast, in the cutting
plane algorithm, the CPU time remains almost unaffected with the increase of α within this
range, and some instances with larger values of α are solved with even less computational
effort. This observation indicates that the cutting plane algorithm is algorithmically stable
and robust.
We also test the algorithms with randomly generated instances. The instances are
randomly generated as follows: the location of facilities and customers are uniformly
distributed over [0, 100] × [0, 100], and the unit transportation cost cij is assumed to be
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proportional to the Euclidean distance in the plane. For each facility j ∈ J , the initial
setup cost fj randomly generated in [2000, 5000] and the failure probability qj is uniformly
generated in [0, 0.1]. Demand of each customer i ∈ I is generated uniformly in [0, 20]. We
set the unit missed demand cost diE = φ = 200 (diE = 200) for all i ∈ I. In such settings,
the missed demand penalty occurs only when all open facilities fail. The computational
results are summarized in Tables 3.2. The first two columns identify the instances with the
number of facilities (|J |) and customers (|I|). Instance sizes are ranged from 50 facilities
and 50 customers to 100 facilities and 150 customers. For each problem size, we generate 10
random instances and hence, solve at total of 150 instances. We report the average values of
the indicators as in Table 3.1 except the CPU time, which we report the minimal, average
and maximal CPU time. In addition, we report the number of instances that cannot be
solved to a gap of 0.5% in 3600 seconds in the column titled “#Unsolved”. We observe that
the cutting plane algorithm is significantly faster than the SnC algorithm on these random
instances. When the instance size becomes large, the sync algorithm is unable to solve almost
all of the instances. For the cutting plane algorithm, it takes an average of 95.9 seconds and
a maximum of 317.97 seconds to solve the 10 random instances of 100 facilities and 150
customers and the average optimality gaps it provides are much smaller than those given by
the SnC algorithm.
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Table 3.2: A comparison of algorithms performance – random instances
|J | |I|
SnC Algorithm Cutting Plane Algorithm
Upper Bound Gap (%)
CPU Time
#Unsolved # Cuts Upper Bound Gap (%)
CPU Time
#Unsolved
Min Ave Max Min Ave Max
50 50 25185 0.38 9.29 44.52 203.71 0 76.9 25185 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.23 0
50 75 32750 0.41 23.40 293.01 1064.16 0 100.6 32750 0.05 0.12 0.25 0.44 0
50 100 40894 0.87 567.88 1874.27 3634.02 3 160.8 40894 0.15 0.28 0.76 1.72 0
50 125 48318 1.48 280.18 3269.28 3672.89 8 207.1 48318 0.13 0.31 1.78 3.50 0
50 150 53262 2.34 3622.99 3654.32 3716.95 10 289.7 53262 0.12 1.36 3.68 6.42 0
75 50 24511 0.41 26.05 154.31 546.36 0 96.2 24511 0.08 0.10 0.27 0.86 0
75 75 32901 0.98 189.58 1897.27 3649.46 4 185.9 32901 0.14 0.30 1.13 2.06 0
75 100 39232 1.74 1685.69 3236.77 3646.23 7 292.4 39232 0.21 0.94 4.04 12.56 0
75 125 45924 2.52 3609.52 3651.35 3719.08 10 289.6 45924 0.21 1.00 5.66 15.35 0
75 150 52339 3.57 3600.34 3655.44 3726.47 10 506.0 52338 0.24 3.71 28.69 85.77 0
100 50 23967 0.41 116.71 525.44 839.72 0 115.7 23967 0.10 0.19 0.43 0.76 0
100 75 32433 1.04 533.84 3032.62 3685.62 8 201.0 32433 0.08 0.80 1.86 4.21 0
100 100 38715 2.41 197.73 3016.86 3678.37 8 322.5 38697 0.27 0.46 6.60 20.04 0
100 125 45935 4.18 3604.48 3649.61 3715.39 10 601.3 45935 0.40 3.09 44.69 172.78 0
100 150 51676 4.45 3629.06 3695.84 3744.53 10 785.1 51661 0.34 27.69 95.90 317.97 0
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Instances with correlated disruptions
In this subsection, we perform a computational study for the reliable facility location
instances with correlated disruptions. We study two examples of correlated disruptions that
are used in the related literatures to demonstrate the capability of the proposed algorithm.
Correlation induced from shared hazard exposure
When the disruption mechanism is well understood, such as when correlations are induced
from shared hazard exposure, the disruption can be conditioned on the states of the
hazard source. This method to characterize the disruption correlation has been studied
in recent literature studying reliable facility location problems [51, 55]. We follow their
study, assuming that there exists a hazard source at the origin and that hazardous event
occurs with a certain probability α. When the hazard occurs, the disaster propagates and
disrupts facilities; a facility j fails with a probability e−|Dj |/θ, where |Dj| is the distance of
location j to the hazard source and θ is a parameter that characterizes the strength of the
disruption propagation effect. The marginal probability of facility disruption at location j
is given by qj = αe
−|Dj |/θ. We adopt the same instances used in subsection 3.3.1 except
that the facility failure probability is defined by the above conditional probability. Similar
to Lu et al. [55], we examine three combinations of the parameters α and θ: α = 0.1 and
θ = 100 (the probability of hazard is low and the propagation effect is low, which we refer
to as the low-risk scenario), α = 0.2 and θ = 200 (the probability of hazard is moderate and
the propagation effect is moderate, which we refer to as the moderate risk scenario), α = 0.3
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and θ = 800 (the probability of hazard is high and the propagation effect is high, which we
refer it to as the high risk scenario).
Table 3.3: Instances with correlation induced from shared hazard exposure
Nodes α θ
Cutting Plane Algorithm – Correlated Cutting Plane Algorithm – Uncorrelated
# Cuts Upper Bound Gap (%) CPU Time # Cuts Upper Bound Gap (%) CPU Time
50 0.1 200 152 995,407 0.48 0.95 183 995,281 0.17 1.00
50 0.2 400 182 1,025,260 0.00 1.54 243 1,022,640 0.23 1.59
50 0.3 800 667 1,139,280 0.49 24.31 461 1,109,550 0.06 16.20
75 0.1 200 231 1,120,330 0.00 7.02 222 1,120,180 0.00 5.86
75 0.2 400 393 1,158,080 0.00 20.73 447 1,154,140 0.00 22.47
75 0.3 800 2039 1,295,240 0.31 1718.38 1659 1,260,560 0.40 631.11
100 0.1 200 631 1,224,000 0.31 87.34 596 1,223,790 0.40 105.25
100 0.2 400 784 1,262,520 0.45 273.24 1018 1,257,740 0.29 217.01
100 0.3 800 2617 1,380,400 3.05 3600.00 2561 1,344,720 1.35 3600.01
Table 3.3 highlights the computational results. The aggregated column titled “Cutting
Plane Algorithm – Correlated” reports the results of the proposed algorithm for instances
with correlated disruptions, and the column titled “Cutting Plane Algorithm – Uncorrelated”
reports the results for corresponding instances with same marginal failure probabilities but
uncorrelated failures. From the result, we observe that the cutting plane algorithm is able
to solve most instances. For the same instance, the objective value, the solution time, and
the number of cuts added all increase with the risk parameters. Compared with instances
in which the disruptions are independent, the objective is larger when the disruptions are
correlated, and the difference increases from the low risk scenario to the high risk scenario.
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Correlations specified by the beta-geometric distribution
In this subsection, we consider facility status as a series of coin flip experiments, with
“heads” and “tails” corresponding to “working” and “failure”. If the coin flip experiments
are independent and the probability of getting “head” is a known constant p, then X,
the number of trials needed to get the first “head” conforms to the (shifted) geometric
distribution with probability mass function P (X = k) = (1 − p)k−1p and is exactly the
case of uncorrelated disruptions, where P (X = k) is the probability that a customer is
served by its k-th closest facility in the context of our problem. If the probability of getting
“head” is not a constant but follows a beta distribution Beta(α, β), then the trials are
positively correlated and X conforms to the beta-geometric distribution. The beta-geometric
distribution and the closely related beta-binomial distribution that models the number of
“heads” in N trials have been used in various fields to model correlation failures, such as in
biometrics (Griffiths [38], Weinberg and Gladen [91]), computer science (Nicola and Goyal
[67]) and marketing (Fader and Hardie [31]). Although Li and Ouyang [51] use the beta-
binomial distribution to model the correlation and derive the conditional probability, we find
beta-geometric distribution approaches the studied problem more directly and the resulting
formula is essentially the same. We denote the beta-geometric distribution BG(α, β), which
has two parameters of the beta distribution. It has the probability mass function:
P (X = t) =
B(α + 1, β + t− 1)
B(α, β)
55
, where B(·, ·) is the beta function. To avoid dealing with the beta function, one can compute
P (T = t) using the following forward-recursion formula:
P (T = t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
α
α+β
t = 1
β+t−2
α+β+t−1P (T = t− 1) t = 2, 3, ...
Let rt denote the conditional probability that the t-th closest facility fails given that all the
closer facilities fail. We have:
rt =
β + t− 1
α + β + t− 1 , t = 1, 2, 3, ...
The probability that the closest facility fails is r1 =
β
α+β
and the formula for rt shows that
the disruptions are positively correlated because rt1 ≤ rt2 for all t1 ≤ t2, and the larger the
value α+β the less significant the correlation. We refer readers to Fader and Hardie [31] for
step-by-step details of the derivations.
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Table 3.4: Instances with correlation specified by beta-geometric distribution
Nodes βα+β α+ β
Cutting Plane Algorithm – Correlated Cutting Plane Algorithm – Uncorrelated
# Cuts Upper Bound Gap (%) CPU Time # Cuts Upper Bound Gap (%) CPU Time
50 0.01 10 170 1,004,760 0.42 1.22 246 1,003,270 0.00 1.14
50 0.01 20 226 1,004,000 0.00 1.22 246 1,003,270 0.00 1.14
50 0.01 50 214 1,005,120 0.29 1.14 246 1,003,270 0.00 1.14
50 0.05 10 372 1,064,520 0.26 5.74 308 1,056,460 0.30 2.83
50 0.05 20 338 1,059,770 0.00 5.98 308 1,056,460 0.30 2.83
50 0.05 50 307 1,057,760 0.00 5.22 308 1,056,460 0.30 2.83
50 0.1 10 874 1,137,710 0.41 31.64 663 1,126,010 0.49 17.55
50 0.1 20 667 1,131,750 0.41 23.72 663 1,126,010 0.49 17.54
50 0.1 50 606 1,127,900 0.42 16.14 663 1,126,010 0.49 17.55
75 0.01 10 339 1,129,830 0.00 9.62 302 1,128,720 0.00 8.45
75 0.01 20 308 1,129,230 0.00 8.24 302 1,128,720 0.00 8.46
75 0.01 50 291 1,128,920 0.00 7.35 302 1,128,720 0.00 8.45
75 0.05 10 553 1,193,330 0.49 74.94 617 1,187,050 0.00 42.50
75 0.05 20 744 1,189,910 0.50 69.70 617 1,187,050 0.00 42.45
75 0.05 50 542 1,188,140 0.11 46.13 617 1,187,050 0.00 42.47
75 0.1 10 1972 1,277,540 0.49 1058.79 1439 1,263,000 0.39 448.38
75 0.1 20 1693 1,269,740 0.43 596.47 1439 1,263,000 0.39 449.82
75 0.1 50 1489 1,266,790 0.50 527.93 1439 1,263,000 0.39 448.77
100 0.01 10 562 1,233,750 0.00 137.64 577 1,232,780 0.35 136.29
100 0.01 20 702 1,233,230 0.41 98.34 577 1,232,780 0.35 136.15
100 0.01 50 577 1,232,960 0.44 106.82 577 1,232,780 0.35 136.46
100 0.05 10 1540 1,289,910 0.45 1960.06 1484 1,284,260 0.30 1157.08
100 0.05 20 1303 1,287,280 0.49 1103.06 1484 1,284,260 0.30 1162.74
100 0.05 50 990 1,285,280 0.47 601.64 1484 1,284,260 0.30 1159.95
100 0.1 10 2886 1,361,450 3.47 3600.48 2335 1,348,630 2.29 3600.00
100 0.1 20 2488 1,356,680 2.32 3600.00 2339 1,348,630 2.27 3600.00
100 0.1 50 2451 1,347,850 1.81 3600.00 2335 1,348,630 2.29 3600.00
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Computational results for reliable supply chain network design problems in which the
correlation is specified by the beta-geometric distribution are shown in Table 3.4. The
instances are the same as those used in the previous section, except that the facility failure
probability is defined by the beta distribution. We vary the value of β
α+β
and α+β to study
the effect of the marginal disruption rate and the degree of correlation. Each column in
Table 3.4 has the same meaning as in the previous subsection. From Table 3.4, we observe
that our algorithm can solve most instances very efficiently. Generally speaking, for the same
instance, the solution time, the objective value and the number of cuts added increase with
the marginal disruption rate and the degree of correlation. Compared with the uncorrelated
counterpart instances, the instances with correlated disruptions have larger objective value
and the difference increases with the degree of the correlation. These observations are
consistent with the results in Table 3.3. There are two discrepancy observations, that is, the
third row has an upper bound larger than the second row for the correlated case, and in the
last row, the correlated case has an upper bound smaller than the uncorrelated case. We
believe this is caused by the existence of an optimality gap.
Instances with Marginal Disruption Probabilities
For instances with marginal disruption probabilities, Lu et al. [55] prove the worst-case
distribution for this problem. Note that when applying the worst-case distribution they
proved, model (3.3) turns into its special case with known distribution in set P . Therefore,
we solve the worst-case problem using the cutting plane algorithm, and compare our results
with those of [55], which is obtained by solving a stochastic programming problem using a
Benders decomposition algorithm.
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The same assumptions from [55] about marginal disruption probabilities are adopted. A
disastrous event occurs at a certain source with probability β (which corresponds to α in [55],
and we change the notation to avoid confusion). When the disaster occurs, it propagates and
causes disruptions to facilities. The marginal disruption probability of facility j, denoted as
qj, decreases exponentially with its distance from the source, denoted as Dj. We assume that
qj is given by qj = βe
−Dj/θ, where the parameter θ characterizes the strength of disruption
propagation effect. For demand, the fixed setup cost, and transportation cost, we use the
same data sets as in subsection 3.3.1, i.e., the data sets in [1]. For both algorithms, we solve
to a 0.5% optimality gap.
The results are shown in Table 3.5. Each instance is characterized by the combination of
the number of nodes, the source disaster probability β, and the disruption propagation factor
θ. As in [55], we assume that the number of nodes is chosen from value the set {50, 75, 100},
β ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3}, and θ ∈ {200, 400, 800}, giving us 27 total instances in total. For each
instance, we compare the objective value, the optimality gap, and the CPU time in seconds
for these two algorithms. From the results, we observe that the cutting plane algorithm out
performs the Benders decomposition algorithm in terms of computational time, and in many
cases the cutting plane algorithm is able to find better solutions.
Instances with Cross Moment of Disruption Probabilities
For instances with cross moment of disruption probabilities, there is no existing comparable
algorithm, so we solve the problem with the cutting plane algorithm directly to show that
this algorithm can provide satisfactory solution in an efficient way.
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Table 3.5: Results for cutting plane algorithm - Marginal disruption probabilities
Instance Lu et al. [55] Cutting Plane Algorithm
Nodes β θ Obj Gap(%) CPU Time #Cuts ΔObj Gap(%) CPU Time
50 0.1 200 998,603 0.42 20.08 132 0 0.01 2.21
400 1,071,085 0.47 23.60 174 -545 0.01 2.56
800 1,426,616 0.48 28.77 141 -3,458 0.00 2.32
50 0.2 200 1,006,565 0.42 22.13 131 0 0.32 2.27
400 1,140,029 0.43 28.32 168 -883 0.37 3.34
800 1,843,037 0.50 19.10 146 -3,611 0.39 2.01
50 0.3 200 1,012,901 0.42 21.68 158 0 0.01 2.39
400 1,209,215 0.49 33.43 187 -3,941 0.38 2.62
800 2,258,727 0.47 17.46 114 -3,033 0.01 1.85
75 0.1 200 1,123,501 0.02 118.61 234 0 0.01 19.02
400 1,201,468 0.03 146.94 258 2,404 0.29 19.61
800 1,604,318 0.01 148.79 191 0 0.01 12.72
75 0.2 200 1,135,638 0.48 110.74 231 -3,275 0.01 16.74
400 1,281,522 0.28 124.93 301 -1,993 0.01 24.35
800 2,090,157 0.47 102.43 216 -4,928 0.41 17.49
75 0.3 200 1,141,226 0.49 110.96 208 0 0.01 15.58
400 1,357,590 0.27 121.64 226 0 0.01 17.97
800 2,568,298 0.37 111.07 272 -5,337 0.46 21.45
100 0.1 200 1,231,258 0.49 727.66 467 -3,583 0.42 146.22
400 1,299,906 0.49 485.45 416 -149 0.01 136.31
800 1,738,672 0.49 634.66 446 -2,879 0.30 171.57
100 0.2 200 1,237,231 0.49 688.72 596 -303 0.37 161.96
400 1,380,660 0.48 461.10 493 -1,128 0.41 157.31
800 2,240,389 0.39 384.49 355 0 0.49 95.16
100 0.3 200 1,245,840 0.23 943.04 514 0 0.01 163.52
400 1,460,349 0.48 440.13 402 -1,192 0.46 105.30
800 2,743,006 0.49 311.32 322 -3,644 0.35 93.48
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The cross moment matrix of disruption probabilities is denoted as matrix Q|J |×|J |, where
the entry qjk corresponds to the joint disruption probability of facility j and facility k.
Specially, the diagonal entry, i.e., qjj, is the marginal disruption probability of facility j. We
generate random matrix Q in the following way: first, we assume a independent distribution
with marginal probability the same as in subsection 3.3.1, i.e., qj = βe
−Dj/θ; we then generate
a sample with size of 5 × |J | from the independent distribution and let the matrix Q be a
cross moment matrix that describes the sample distribution. For demand, the fixed setup
cost, and the transportation cost, we use the same data sets as in subsection 3.3.1, i.e., the
data sets in [1]. The results are shown in Table 3.6. The instances considered, i.e., the
combination of the number of nodes and the values of β and θ, are the same as in Table 3.5.
From the results, we observe that the cutting plane algorithm is able to solve samll
instances efficiently, e.g., 10 nodes or 20 nodes. We also notice that when the value of θ
increases from 200 to 800, the solution time increases significantly. This increase factor also
increases with instance size. Therefore, the instances with 50 nodes and θ = 400 or 800
become extremely difficult for the proposed algorithm to solve.
3.3.2 Results of Multi-start Tabu Search
In this subsection, we study the performance of the MSTS algorithm for solving RFLP
instances with independent disruptions.
According to our discussion in subsection 3.2.2, the number of start nStarts and the
stopping criterion StabilityLimit significantly affect the efficiency of the MSTS algorithm.
For all the computations below, we set nStarts = 20 and StabilityLimit = 20, according
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Table 3.6: Results for cutting plane algorithm - Cross moment of disruption probabilities
Instance Cutting Plane Algorithm
Nodes β θ #Cuts Obj Gap(%) CPU Time
10 0.1 200 14 539,356 0.00 0.61
400 13 539,356 0.00 0.78
800 21 597,117 0.00 4.46
0.2 200 13 545,225 0.00 0.62
400 18 554,397 0.00 1.85
800 19 615,285 0.00 6.48
0.3 200 18 542,659 0.11 1.50
400 15 581,538 0.00 0.55
800 23 652,007 0.00 6.00
20 0.1 200 42 770,300 0.01 6.55
400 40 781,371 0.00 13.49
800 53 807,559 0.00 171.16
0.2 200 45 776,661 0.00 7.86
400 55 794,413 0.00 39.92
800 76 852,476 0.01 830.31
0.3 200 40 773,959 0.00 5.95
400 40 816,136 0.00 119.79
800 74 887,295 0.16 3518.79
50 0.1 200 136 997,204 0.01 1527.70
400 50 1,102,230 287.51 3600.25
800 1 4,507,876 6678.76 3603.36
0.2 200 114 999,456 0.49 869.38
400 2 2,526,397 1128.19 3693.15
800 1 40,624,200 60989.00 3604.67
0.3 200 161 1,003,734 0.00 2346.48
400 2 2,466,342 921.68 3618.49
800 1 8,048,309 12002.70 3614.29
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to the parameter tuning process in the appendix. We also study the acceleration of the
MSTS algorithm when applying the parallelization techniques. Details of the acceleration
are available in appendix-A.
We test the proposed multi-start tabu search algorithm’s performance with the instances
used in Aboolian et al. [1]. Table 3.7 summarizes the results. The results from the proposed
exact algorithm is also listed for comparison. For the MSTS, because it is a randomized
algorithm, we perform 10 runs for each instance to reduce the occasionality. We report the
best, worst and average objective values obtained by the heuristic algorithm among 10 runs.
Table 3.7 shows that the MSTS finds a very high quality solution much faster than the exact
algorithm. For many instances, it finds the optimal solution in all 10 runs.
The algorithm is also tested with very large random instances. The random instances
are generated in the same way as in subsection 3.3.1. The size of the instances ranges from
200 potential facilities and 200 customers to 600 potential facilities and 800 customers. The
instances are also solved with the cutting plane algorithm with a time limit of 7200 seconds.
Table 3.8 reports the results. The cutting plane algorithm fails to solve all of these instances
to optimality within the time limit. The upper bounds are the best objective values that have
been found when the algorithm terminates. For the MSTS, we run the algorithm 10 times
and report the minimal, average, and maximal values of the upper bound and the CPU time
used. As can be seen from Table 3.8, the MSTS is able to solve extremely large instances
within a reasonable amount of time. With respect to the solution quality, the MSTS find
solutions with equal or better quality than the cutting plane algorithm even in the worst
case among the 10 runs (except the worst case for 400 facilities and 400 customers).
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Table 3.7: Performance of the multi-start tabu search algorithm on benchmark instances
Nodes α
Cutting Plane Algorithm Multi-start Tabu search
Upper Bound CPU Time
Upper Bound
Iterations CPU Time
Best Ave Worst
50 1 1,020,180 1.73 1,020,180 1,020,180 1,020,180 1250.2 0.4331
50 1.1 1,021,890 2.18 1,021,890 1,021,890 1,021,890 1215.7 0.4194
50 1.2 1,023,610 1.65 1,023,610 1,023,610 1,023,610 1245.8 0.4333
50 1.3 1,025,330 1.85 1,025,330 1,025,330 1,025,330 1285.1 0.4419
50 1.4 1,026,980 1.68 1,026,980 1,026,980 1,026,980 1109.6 0.3854
50 1.5 1,028,490 2.10 1,028,490 1,028,500 1,028,600 1093.4 0.3767
75 1 1,148,490 14.16 1,148,490 1,148,490 1,148,490 1391.9 1.2463
75 1.1 1,150,490 11.47 1,150,490 1,150,490 1,150,490 1410.9 1.3171
75 1.2 1,152,500 15.28 1,152,500 1,152,500 1,152,500 1409.9 1.2999
75 1.3 1,154,510 19.05 1,154,510 1,154,510 1,154,510 1405.7 1.2871
75 1.4 1,156,520 23.15 1,156,520 1,156,520 1,156,520 1402.8 1.2916
75 1.5 1,158,540 17.46 1,158,540 1,158,540 1,158,540 1367.4 1.2461
100 1 1,252,600 207.05 1,252,600 1,252,600 1,252,600 1532.5 2.9813
100 1.1 1,254,600 244.51 1,254,600 1,254,600 1,254,600 1510.3 2.8418
100 1.2 1,256,610 204.52 1,256,610 1,256,700 1,257,500 1447.1 2.6782
100 1.3 1,258,630 207.29 1,258,630 1,258,700 1,259,310 1471.7 2.7327
100 1.4 1,260,650 242.25 1,260,650 1,260,650 1,260,650 1508.8 2.8135
100 1.5 1,262,670 363.55 1,262,670 1,262,670 1,262,670 1501.8 2.8676
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Table 3.8: Performance of the multi-start tabu search algorithm on large size random
instances
|J | |I|
Cutting Plane Algorithm Multi-start tabu search
Upper Bound CPU Time
Upper Bound CPU Time
Best Ave Worst Min Ave Max
200 200 58137 7200.87 58137 58137 58137 16.91 22.87 29.79
200 400 102114 7200.29 100932 100956 100998 36.28 49.33 65.02
200 600 131082 7200.03 128270 128463 128967 56.69 74.92 99.46
200 800 160749 7200.00 158295 158567 158809 67.19 99.11 127.66
400 200 61837 7200.01 61213 61386 61514 126.03 250.60 367.22
400 400 95272 7200.01 94599 94805 95321 280.80 410.00 545.15
400 600 128505 7200.02 123501 123655 124069 394.94 784.99 1149.21
400 800 156446 7200.00 151960 152294 152520 463.24 794.04 1495.11
600 200 63292 7200.02 61078 61131 61188 414.44 736.44 1171.49
600 400 101333 7200.02 97661 97902 98189 930.21 1640.13 2399.03
600 600 129135 7200.03 123920 124227 124495 1755.01 2492.36 3521.72
600 800 157959 7200.00 151738 152309 152783 1787.61 3527.27 4990.80
Acceleration of MSTS Algorithm with Parallelization
Because each start of the tabu search is independent of the others, the algorithm can be
easily paralleled by letting each start run in parallel. The parallelization of the algorithm
is implemented using OpenMP. This set of computations is done using the Newton high
performance compute (HPC) cluster (https://newton.utk.edu/). We limit our parallelization
to 48 processors because this is the current limit on the cluster. In Figure 3.2 we present
speedup of the proposed MSTS with respect to the number of processors. The algorithm is
applied to instances with 50, 75, and 100 nodes with α = 1 and the number of starts is set
to 500. From Figure 3.2, we observe that it achieves an almost linear speedup.
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Figure 3.2: Parallel multi-start tabu search
66
Chapter 4
Efficient Solution Methods for a
General r-interdiction Median
Problem with Fortification
4.1 Problem Definition and Formulation
Consider an existing supply network with a set of operating facilities J = {1, ..., p} and a set
of customer demand aggregation points I = {1, ..., |I|}. Each customer i ∈ I has demand
given by di. The unit shipment cost from facility j ∈ J to customer i ∈ I is cij. The
efficiency of the system is measured by the total weighted distance between customers and
the facilities. The capacity of a facility is assumed to be unlimited. Thus, a customer is
always served by its nearest working facility. Furthermore, we assume there is an emergency
facility 0 to model the costs of lost sales. If the demand of customer i ∈ I is not served, a
unit penalty cost ci0 is incurred. Without loss of generality, we assume that ci0 ≥ cij for all
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i ∈ I and j ∈ J ; that is, any customer will be served if there is at least one available facility.
Let J+ denote the set open facilities including the emergency facility, i.e., J+ = {0, 1, ..., p}
.
Facilities face two types of disruption risks simultaneously: probabilistic, exogenous risks
and worst-case, endogenous risks. The two types of risks are independent from each other.
A facility fails if either of these two disruption risks takes effect. For exogenous risks, facility
j fails with probability qj. Facility disruptions caused by exogenous risks are independent
across facilities. Endogenous risks are modeled by an attacker with r interdict resources.
Each unit of these resources can be used to attack a facility; however, two or more units
cannot be used on the same facility. If a facility is not fortified, an attack succeeds for sure.
However, if the facility is fortified, the probability of successful attack is w. The total number
of fortified locations is bounded above by h due to limited defensive resources. The problem
is to determine h locations to fortify to minimize expected transportation costs anticipating
worst-case attacks.
The problem can be viewed as a leader-follower game, as illustrated by Figure 4.1:
the leader, that is, the network planner or defender, aims to minimize costs by making
fortification decisions, then the follower, that is, the attacker, tries to interdict the network to
maximize its damage. The following bi-level model is formulated by adding the probabilistic
disruption factor to the RIMF-p model proposed by Zhu et al. [96].
Defender’s decision variables:
zj =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1, if facility j is fortified;
0, otherwise.
Attacker’s decision variables:
68
Minimize:    Expectation of transportation costs
Determine: Facilities to fortify
Maximize:    Expectation of transportation costs
Determine: Facilities to attack
Defender’s problem
Attacker’s problem
anticipate
Figure 4.1: Bi-level problem
sj =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1, if facility is attacked;
0, otherwise.
The fortification problem (FP) is written as:
minF (z) (4.1)
s.t.
∑
j∈J zj ≤ h ∀j ∈ J (4.2)
zj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ J
F (z) is the expected transportation costs under worst-case attacks for a fortification decision
z and is computed by solving the attacker’s problem.
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A facility j’s failure probability pj is an expression relating to sj:
pj = 1− (1− qj)(1− sjwzj) (4.3)
When zj = 0, i.e., the facility is not fortified, w
zj = 1, and the facility is disrupted for
sure when it is attacked, i.e., pj = 1, as long as sj = 1. Otherwise, the facility fails when
either the probabilistic disruption, with probability qj, takes place or an intentional attack
succeeds, with probability w.
Then we can compute the probability that customer i is assigned to its v-th closest facility
as:
βiiv =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1− piv , v = 1;
(1− piv)×
∏v−1
l=1 pil , 2 ≤ v ≤ |J+|;
(4.4)
The expected transpiration costs can be expressed as:
∑
i∈I
|J+|∑
v=1
ciivdiβiiv =
∑
i∈I
cii1di(1− pi1) +
∑
i∈I
|J+|∑
v=2
ciivdi(1− piv)×
v−1∏
l=1
piv (4.5)
Thus, F (z) is computed by solving the attacker’s problem (AP):
F (z) = max
∑
i∈I
cii1di(1− pi1) +
∑
i∈I
|J+|∑
v=2
ciivdi(1− piv)×
v−1∏
l=1
piv (4.6)
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s.t.
∑
j∈J sj ≤ r ∀j ∈ J+, (4.7)
pj = 1− (1− qj)(1− sjwzj) ∀j ∈ J+, (4.8)
sj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ J+.
In the bi-level model, the defender makes an upper-level decision, and the objective
is to minimize expected transportation costs under worst-case attacks, which is given by
solving the attacker’s problem. Constraints (4.2) and (4.7) model the limited resources of
the defender and attacker, respectively. The attacker’s objective is to maximize the expected
transportation costs after launching attacks.
The difficulty of the attacker’s problem arises from the high degree of nonlinearity in its
objective function and its constraints (4.8). Even for a special case such as the one studied
by Zhu et al. [96] in which only disruptions caused by intentional attacks are considered,
there is no solution method proposed other than enumeration. For the fortification problem,
only a greedy heuristic method is proposed. An additional special case is one in which w = 0;
that is, an attack fails for sure if a fortified facility is attacked. The problem is studied by
Church et al. [19], Church and Scaparra [21], Scaparra and Church [76, 77], and Liberatore
et al. [52]. In such a case, the attacker’s problem can be formulated as a mixed integer
programming model, and therefore a commercial solver such as CPLEX can be used to solve
the problem. For the fortification problem with this attacker’s problem as the lower level
problem, there exist relatively efficient solution methods in the literature (e.g., [76, 77]).
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4.2 Model Properties
In this section, we discuss the structure properties of the model from a set function point
of view, which provides the theoretical cornerstone for the solution methods developed in
the next section. Some preliminary knowledge of supermodular function is reviewed in
Section 3.1.1, in Chapter 3. Same notations are used in this section.
4.2.1 The Attacker’s Problem
Consider a known fortification decision, let Θ(S) be a function defined on a subset S of J+
and Θ(S) is defined as the expected transportation costs when facilities in S are attacked.
Next, we show Θ is supermodular.
Proposition 4.1. Θ is nondecreasing.
Proof: It is sufficient to show Θ is nonincreasing if Θ(S∪{e}) ≥ Θ(S) for any S ∈ J+, e /∈ S.
Let Γi(S) be a set function corresponding to the expected transportation for customer i, thus
Θ(S) =
∑
i∈I Γi(S), where Γi(S) =
∑|J+|
l=1 βiilciil . By lemma 3.2, it is sufficient to show Γi(S)
is nondecreasing for any i.
Without loss of generality, assume facility e is the k-th closest facility of the customer,
and let pe be the probability facility e fails when e is not attacked and p
′
e be the probability
when e is attacked. Obviously, p′e ≥ pe, the equality holds when w = 0 and the facility is
fortified. We have:
Γi(S ∪ {e}) =
k−1∑
l=1
βiilciil +
1− p′k
1− pkβiikciik +
p′k
pk
|J+|∑
l=k+1
βiilciil .
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Thus,
ρΓie (S) = Γi(S ∪ {e})− Γi(S) = pk−p
′
k
1−pk βiikciik +
p′k−pk
pk
∑|J+|
l=k+1 βiilciil
≥ ciik(pk−p
′
k
1−pk βiik +
p′k−pk
pk
∑|J+|
l=k+1 βiil)
= ciik(
pk−p′k
1−pk βiik +
p′k−pk
pk
× pk
1−pk × βiik)
= 0.
The second line holds because by the definition of cl, we have cii1 ≤ cii2 ... ≤ cii|J+| .
Because there is an emergency facility, thus pii|J+| = 0 and βii|J+| =
∏|J+|−1
l=1 pil . With simple
chaining process, we have:
|J+|∑
l=k+1
βiil =
pk
1− pkβk. (4.9)
This completes the proof.
Proposition 4.2. Θ is supermodular.
Proof: Consider another set T , T = S ∪ {σ}, σ = e, σ, e /∈ S. σ is the u-th closest facility.
similarly, we have:
Γi(T ) =
u−1∑
l=1
βiilciil +
1− p′u
1− puβiiuciiu +
p′u
pu
|J+|∑
l=u+1
βiilciil .
Case 1, u < k:
Γi(T ∪ {e}) =
u−1∑
l=1
βiilciil +
1− p′u
1− puβiiuciiu +
p′u
pu
k−1∑
l=u+1
βiilciil +
p′u
pu
× p
′
k
pk
|J+|∑
l=k+1
βiilciil .
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ρΓie (T ) = Γi(T ∪ {e})− Γi(T ) =
p′u
pu
(
pk − p′k
1− pk βiikciik +
p′k − pk
pk
|J+|∑
l=k+1
βiilciil).
Recall,
ρΓie (S) = Γi(S ∪ {e})− Γi(S) =
pk − p′k
1− pk βiikciik +
p′k − pk
pk
|J+|∑
l=k+1
βiilciil .
.
We have:
ρΓie (T ) =
p′u
pu
ρΓie (S) ≥ ρΓie (S).
.
Case 2, u > k:
Γi(T∪{e}) =
k−1∑
l=1
βiilciil+
1− p′k
1− pkβiikciik+
p′k
pk
u−1∑
l=k+1
βiilciil+
p′k
pk
×1− p
′
u
1− puβiiuciiu+
p′k
pk
×p
′
u
pu
×
|J+|∑
l=u+1
βiilciil .
ρΓie (T ) = Γi(T ∪ {e})− Γi(T ) =
=
pk−p′k
1−pk βiikciik +
p′k−pk
pk
∑u−1
l=k+1 βiilciil +
p′k−pk
pk
× 1−p′u
1−puβiiuciiu +
p′k−pk
pk
× pu
pu
∑|J+|
l=u+1 βiilciil .
Thus,
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ρΓie (T )− ρΓie (S) = p
′
k−pk
pk
(pu−p
′
u
1−pu βiiuciiu +
p′u−pu
pu
∑|J+|
l=u+1 βiilciil)
≥ p′k−pk
pk
(pu−p
′
u
1−pu βiiuciiu + ciiu ×
p′u−pu
pu
∑|J+|
l=u+1 βiil)
=
p′k−pk
pk
× ciiu(pu−p
′
u
1−pu βiiu +
p′u−pu
pu
× pu
p′u−pu )
= 0,
In summary, ρΓie (T )− ρΓie (S) ≥ 0 when T has exactly one more element than S.
Consider any sets S ⊆ T ⊂ J+ and e ∈ J+ \ T , let V = T \ S = {v1, v2, ..., vn}.
We have
ρΓie (S ∪ {v1})− ρΓie (S) ≥ 0
ρΓie (S ∪ {v1, v2})− ρΓie (S ∪ {v1}) ≥ 0
...
ρΓie (T )− ρΓie ((S ∪ {v1, ..., vn}) ≥ 0.
Sum the inequalities, we have ρΓie (T ) ≥ ρΓie (S). By second condition in Definition 3.1,
we completes the proof.
4.2.2 The Fortification Problem
Define Ψ(Z) as the corresponding set function for F (z). Let I(Z) be the attacked facilities
in an optimal solution of the attackers’ problem when Z is the fortification set.
Proposition 4.3. Ψ is nonincreasing.
It is clear Ψ is nonincreasing.
Proposition 4.4. ρΨe (Z) = 0, if e /∈ I(Z).
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Proof: Because I(Z) is a feasible solution for the attack problem, Ψ(Z ∪{e}) ≥ Θ(I(Z)) =
Ψ(Z). Since Ψ is nonincreasing, Ψ(Z∪{e}) ≤ Ψ(Z), thus Ψ(Z∪{e}) = Ψ(Z), i.e., ρe(Z) = 0.
The same observation is made by [76] for RIMF, and it immediately implies Proposi-
tion 4.5 and the tree search algorithm [76] is also applicable to solve this problem.
Proposition 4.5. There exists an optimal solution Z∗ where at least one j such that j ∈ I(∅)
and j ∈ Z∗.
Proposition 4.6. Ψ is neither supermodular nor submodular.
Proof: We prove this by providing two examples. In the first example, we show a case
where it is not supermodular. Then, we use another example to show it is not submodular.
Example 1: Consider an instance with one customer, three facilities, and an emergency
facility as shown by Figure 4.2, i.e., cij = j, and ci0 = 4. Let r = 3, w = 0.5 and qj = 0 for
j = 1, 2, 3. Thus, if a facility is fortified, then the probability of fail pj = 0.5, otherwise it
fails for sure. Consider facility 2 as e, it is easy to compute Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Function values with different T for example 1
T = ∅ {1} {1, 3}
Ψ(T ) 4 2.5 2.25
Ψ({e} ∪ T ) 3 2 1.875
ρΨe (T ) -1 -0.5 -0.375
Because ρΨe (∅) < ρΨe ({1}) < ρΨe ({1, 3}), Ψ violates the definition of a supermodular
function.
Example 2: Consider an instance with the same structure as example 1. However, we
assume there is only one attack unit, i.e., r = 1. Let w = 0 and qj = 0.5 for j = 1, 2, 3. In
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Customer
Emergency Facility
2
3 1
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Facility 2
Facility 3
Figure 4.2: A instance of fortification problem
this case, if a facility is fortified, it is immune to the attack, while it fails at probability of
0.5 even no attack is lunched of that facility. For this case, we have following Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Function values with different T for example 2
T = ∅ {1} {1, 3}
Ψ(T ) 2.75 2.25 2.25
Ψ({e} ∪ T ) 2.75 2 1.875
ρΨe (T ) 0 -0.25 -0.375
Because ρΨe (∅) > ρΨe ({1}) > ρΨe ({1, 3}), Ψ violates the definition of a submodular
function.
Proposition 4.7. When attack solution is fixed, let Ψ¯ be the function for the corresponding
fortification problem. Ψ¯ is a nonincreasing supermodular function.
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Proof: Let p↑j be the probability of disruption for facility j when j is not fortified, and
p↓j be the the probability when it is fortified. When we prove Proposition 4.2, the result of
attacking a facility is equivalent to increase the probability of disruption for that facility.
Correspondingly, fortifying a facility is equivalent to decrease the probability. Thus, we
can construct nondecreasing supermodular function Θ(S) such that a facility fails with
probability p↑j for j ∈ S, and p↓j for j /∈ S. Let S be the complement set of S. Ψ¯(S) = Θ(S).
Because Θ is a nondecreasing supermodular, Ψ¯ is nonincreasing supermodular.
4.3 Solution Methods
4.3.1 For the Attacker’s Problem
We have shown that the AP is equivalent to maximizing a nondecreasing supermodular
function with cardinality constraints. Recall that −f is submodular if f is supermodular.
The problem is also equivalent to minimizing a nonincreasing submodular function with
cardinality constraints. Because a supermodular function has its equivalent submodular
counterpart, in the literature, the term submodular is commonly used instead of supermod-
ular to maintain consistency in terminology.
The relationship can be summarized with the following four-way contingency Table 4.3.
The diagonal elements are equivalent.
Table 4.3: Relationship of submodular and supermodular optimization
Objective
Function Minimize Maximize
Submodular Polynomial solvable NP-hard
Supermodular NP-hard Polynomial solvable
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Minimizing a general submodular function can be solved in strong polynomial time
[44, 69]. The most theoretically efficient algorithm known is the one developed by [69],
which runs in O(n5EO + n6), where n is the size of the ground set and EO is the time to
evaluate the function with a given subset. However, methods for incorporating additional
constraints, such as cardinality constraints or, more generally, knapsack constraints, are not
discussed. In fact, the problem may become significantly harder when side constraints are
added. There are cases of submodular function minimization with side constraints that are
NP-hard McCormick [58]. Some research considers knapsack constraints in the context of
submodular optimization; however, most of this research relates to maximizing a submodular
function [87, 49, 45, 47]. To the best of our knowledge, there is no combinatorial method
developed for minimizing a monotone, nonincreasing, submodular function with cardinality
constraints or knapsack constraints.
Next we outline a cutting plane algorithm that solves the AP exactly. A similar approach
has been developed for solving supply chain design problem where a cost term appears to
be submodular [92]. The cutting plane algorithm iteratively solves a series of MIP master
problems and subproblems. Because the solution methods uses a MIP master problem, it
can easily include additional side constraints, which can be useful in practice.
To be consistent with terminology used in the literature, instead of maximizing a
supermodular function, we reformulate the problem as a submodular function minimization.
Define set function Ω(S) = −Θ(S) + Θ(∅), such that Ω is a nonincreasing submodular
function with Ω(∅) = 0. The AP is equivalent to
min{Ω(S) : |S| ≤ r, S ⊆ J}.
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Definition 4.8. Given a submodular function f with f(∅) = 0, the submodular polyhedron
P (f) is defined as P (f) = {v : v ∈ Rn, ∀S ⊆ U, v(S) ≤ f(S)}, where v(S) =∑i∈S vi.
With a slight abuse of notation, we define f(s) = f(S), where s is the incidence vector
for the set S.
The convex lower envelope for the submodular function is:
Qf = {(s, t),∈ {0, 1}n × R : f(s) ≤ t}
.
Theorem 4.9. The inequality t ≥ ∑i∈U visi is a valid inequality for Qf if and only if
v ∈ P (f). Atamtu¨Rk and Narayanan [7]
The inequality defined above is called an extended polymatroid inequality. Given a
solution (s¯, t¯), we can check whether in Qf or we find a an extended polymatroid inequality
to cut off the infeasible solution. The problem is written as:
t∗ = max{
∑
i∈U
vis¯i : v ∈ P (f)},
and can be solved with the Greedy Algorithm [27]:
Step 1 For a given s, sort U such that sl1 ≥ sl2 ≥ .. ≥ sln
Step 2 Compute v¯i as f({l1, l2, .., li}) - f({l1, l2, .., li−1}), which is the incremental value by
adding li to {l1, l2, .., li−1}.
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Because si only takes value in 0 and 1, Step 1 runs in O(n), and Step 2 can be done
with n sequential calls to function evaluation. Thus, the algorithm runs with a time bound
O(nEO), and we have
∑
i∈U v¯is¯i = f(S). If t¯ ≥ t∗, no extended polymatroid inequality is
violated, or we find a cut in the following form:
t ≥ v¯1s1 + v¯2s2 + ...+ v¯nsn.
The master problem (AP-master) is formulated as:
min t (4.10)
s.t. t ≥ v¯1ks1 + v¯2ks2 + ...+ v¯nksn ∀k ∈ K, (4.11)∑
j∈J+ sj ≤ r ∀j ∈ J+,
sj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ J+,
where K is the collection of cuts from previous iterations. The cutting plane algorithm starts
by solving AP-master with constraints (4.11) being empty. Let (s¯, t¯) be the optimal solution
to the master problem. Note that the problem can be unbounded in the first iteration, in
this case t = −∞. Add a cut if necessary with the Greedy Algorithm as outlined above.
The process repeat until a solution does not violate any extended polymatroid inequality.
The algorithm then terminates with an optimal solution to the problem.
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4.3.2 For the Fortification Problem
Compared with the AP, the FP is much harder for two reasons. First, unlike AP in which
the objective value can be directly computed in polynomial time with a given solution,
to evaluate a solution for FP one needs to solve a corresponding AP. Second, because we
have shown that FP is neither submodular nor supermodular, there is not much structural
information we can use. We next develop a logic-based Benders decomposition algorithm for
solving the problem.
A logic-based Benders decomposition
The logic-based Benders decomposition introduced by [42] is a generalization of the
Benders decomposition. Like Benders decomposition, the logic-based Benders decomposition
decomposes the original problem into a master problem and (a) subproblem(s) with
corresponding variables denoted as x and y. The master problem is solved to obtain a
solution for variables x, then subproblems are solved for y given the fixed x values.
The cuts in the Benders decomposition are based on linear duality, which requires the
subproblem to be a linear programming problem whereas the subproblem of a logic-based
Benders decomposition can be in any form of a mathematical program. The inference duals
are used instead of the linear duals. Because of this, there is no standard algorithm to
generate cuts for the logic-based Benders decomposition and one has to derive cuts based on
knowledge of the underlying problem. The cutting plane methods we propose in the previous
section are actually a special case of logic Benders decompositions where the inference duals
is readily provided by the supermodular property.
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The efficiency of a logic-based Bender decomposition depends on how the master problem
and subproblem are defined and is highly affected by the tightness of the cut. We can write
the master problem of FP as:
min η (4.12)
s.t. logic-based Benders cuts (4.13)
∑
j∈J+ zj ≤ h ∀j ∈ J+
zj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ J+
where, η is a nonnegative continuous variable to simulate transportation costs. The
relationship between η and decision variables x and z is established by the logic-based
Benders cuts.
Given a solution (z¯, η¯) to the master problem, we compute the transportation costs by
solving an AP, and let η∗ = F (z¯). If η∗ > η¯, then the current solution is infeasible and a cut
that eliminates such a solution should be added to the master problem.
With the assumption that the master problem has a finite domain, Chu and Xia [17]
shows that the algorithm is guaranteed to converge to an optimal solution if the cuts satisfy
the following two conditions:
1 If the current master problem solution x is infeasible, then the cut must exclude at least
x;
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2 Any feasible solution x satisfies the cut.
Clearly the result holds for our problem even though it has a continuous variable η because
the model always tries to minimize η. A cut that satisfies both conditions is called valid.
Theorem 4.10. Cuts in the form of (4.14) guarantee that the algorithm finds an optimal
solution in finite iterations.
η ≥ η∗ − η∗(
∑
j∈z¯j=0
zj +
∑
j∈z¯j=1
(1− zj)) (4.14)
Proof: Clearly, the cut satisfies for condition 1, for if incumbent solution (z¯, η¯) is infeasible,
i.e., η¯ < η∗, the cut ensures the solution is cut off by requiring η ≥ η∗ for solution (z¯). For
any solution other than (z¯), the cut is inactive. Thus, it does not eliminate any feasible
solution.
Obviously, the algorithm based on cut (4.14) is inefficient since it does no better than
simple enumeration of all of the possible combinations of z, i.e., all subsets of J . Now
consider a family of cuts in the following form:
η ≥ η∗ +
∑
j∈z¯j=0
Δzjzj +
∑
j∈z¯j=1
∇zj(1− zj) (4.15)
, where Δzj is a coefficient used to capture the change of transportation costs by fortifying
facility j and ∇zj is used to capture the change of transportation costs when the defense
resource is removed from facility j. Clearly, Δzj ≤ 0 and ∇zj ≥ 0. When set Δzj = −η∗ for
j, z¯j = 0 and ∇zj = 0 for j, z¯j = 1, it is easy to verify it is a valid cut and is at least as tight
as (4.14). For simplicity, we let ∇zj = 0 and focus on analyzing Δzj .
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η ≥ η∗ +
∑
j∈z¯j=0
Δzjzj (4.16)
Let Z denote the corresponding fortified locations for the incumbent solution z¯.
Theorem 4.11. Cuts in the form of (4.16) with Δzj = Δ̂
z
j are valid.
Δ̂zj = min
T,Z⊆T⊆J,
{Ψ(T ∪ {j})−Ψ(T )} for j ∈ J, j /∈ Z (4.17)
Proof: Clearly the cut eliminates infeasible incumbent solutions. We next show that it
does not eliminate any feasible solution.
Consider a cut generated with an incumbent solution Z. For another solution Z ′, Z ⊆ Z ′.
Let ZΔ = Z
′ \Z. Consider an arbitrary order of ZΔ, {l1, l2, .., ln}. Let Li = Z ∪{l1, l2, ..., li}.
We have
Ψ(Z ′) = Ψ(Z) +
n∑
i=1
ρΨli (L
i−1)
By the definition of Δ̂zj , we have Δ̂
z
li
≤ ρΨli (Li−1)
Ψ(Z ′) ≥ η∗ +
∑
j∈z¯j=0
Δˆzjzj
Thus, cut (4.17) does not eliminate solution Z ′ for any Z  Z ′. Because Ψ is a
nonincreasing function regarding both set variables, if Z ⊆ Z ′, the inequality still holds by
adding missing elements in Z to Z ′. Thus, the cut does not eliminate any feasible solution.
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However, computing Δ̂zj is hard in general. Next, we propose a family of cuts that can
be computed in no more than a linear number of calls to the AP. The basic idea is to find
an approximation to the lower bound Δ̂zj .
Because of Proposition 4.4, an optimal solution T to (4.17) must satisfy j ∈ I(T ). The
motivation for the following cut by forcing j to be included by I(Z).
Define the restricted attack problem F ♦j (z) by forcing facility j to be attacked. This can
be achieved by adding the constraint in the master model of AP:
sj ≥ 1. (4.18)
Let Ψj denote the set function for the corresponding fortification problem. We always
have j ∈ I(T ) for j /∈ T .
Δ˜zj = Ψj(Z ∪ {j})−Ψj(Z) for j ∈ J, j /∈ Z (4.19)
It is still an open question whether cuts with coefficient Δ˜zj are valid cut or not for the
problem. To compute a coefficient, we need to solve two APs. Because we only want to find
a lower bound approximation for the coefficient, we can first compute Ψj(Z), and find the
corresponding interdiction set I(Z), and compute a lower bound of Ψj(Z ∪{j}) by fixing the
interdiction solution to I(Z).
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4.4 Computational Study
In this section, we test the performance of the proposed algorithms. We implement the
algorithms in Scala and solve all of the problem instances on a Dell OptiPlex 9010 with
one Intel 3.40 GHz CPU and 4G of memory running the Ubuntu operating system. The
MIP problems are solved using the ILOG CPLEX Academic Initiative Edition 12.6. The
U.S. dataset is used to test the algorithms’ performance. The U.S. dataset is based on 2000
census data and contains the largest cities in the U.S. and is used in related works [1, 24, 80].
The exogenous probabilistic disruption rate is computed as pj = αe
−Dj/θ, where Dj is the
distance from the location to New Orleans.
4.4.1 Solving the Attacker’s Problem
Because there is no solution method other than enumeration available in the literature, we
compare the cutting plane algorithm with enumeration. The algorithms are tested with
instances ranging from 50 nodes to 150 nodes. In the dataset, a node is a customer and a
candidate location. Thus, we first solve a p-median problem to select p facilities. We assume
that no facility is fortified, and we test three values for the number of facilities attacked r,
i.e., 3, 6, and 9, which covers the range of r values used in most related works. The results
are summarized in Table 4.4. Columns tilted “nbEO” reports the number of calls to evaluate
a solution (z, s), i.e, to compute objective function (4.6). For the enumeration method, the
number of calls equals the combination number
(
p
r
)
. It is not surprising that the cutting
plane algorithm always finds an optimal solution. While the solution time for enumeration
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increases exponentially with respect to p and r, the increase is very mild for the cutting
plane algorithm.
We also test the algorithm’s performance by varying parameters that affect the disruption
probabilities, such as w, α, θ. Three combinations of α and θ are tested to simulate
low, moderate, and high probabilistic disruption risks: (0.1, 200), (0.2, 400), and (0.3, 800)
respectively. We randomly fortify
⌊
p
2
⌋
facilities. The results are reported in Table 4.5- 4.8.
Columns tilted “nbCuts” report the number of cuts in the form of (4.11) is added to the
master problem. From the results, we observe that when w increases, the objective value
increases, and the solution time and the number of cuts generated increases in general. Recall
that w is the probability that an attack succeeds when a facility is fortified. The objective
value increases with the probabilistic disruption risk factors α and θ. However, no obvious
pattern is observed in terms of how the these factors affect the solution time and the number
of cuts generated.
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Table 4.4: Cutting plane algorithm’s performance on solving AP
Nodes p r
Enumeration Cutting plane
Obj. Time nbEO ΔObj. Time nbEO
50 15 3 1101845.24 0.14 455 0 0.29 374
50 15 6 1976813.06 0.55 5005 0 0.11 740
50 15 9 3240988.49 0.42 5005 0 0.11 969
50 20 3 792317.18 0.07 1140 0 0.07 552
50 20 6 1455117.90 1.70 38760 0 0.14 1503
50 20 9 2202803.09 7.44 167960 0 0.20 2043
50 30 3 431071.16 0.29 4060 0 0.19 1774
50 30 6 845343.21 41.89 593775 0 0.48 4224
50 30 9 1423410.35 1012.98 14307150 0 0.66 5002
75 15 3 1265758.87 0.03 455 0 0.03 339
75 15 6 2303228.54 0.24 5005 0 0.06 805
75 15 9 3246383.92 0.24 5005 0 0.09 966
75 20 3 897856.49 0.08 1140 0 0.06 656
75 20 6 1732421.59 2.53 38760 0 0.15 1665
75 20 9 2355708.23 11.04 167960 0 0.25 2109
75 30 3 514184.54 0.40 4060 0 0.25 2177
75 30 6 1132851.13 59.78 593775 0 0.49 3700
75 30 9 1707084.16 1443.23 14307150 0 1.18 7727
100 15 3 1372013.35 0.03 455 0 0.05 548
100 15 6 2502580.27 0.30 5005 0 0.12 1272
100 15 9 3534156.55 0.30 5005 0 0.13 1245
100 20 3 1002426.94 0.10 1140 0 0.09 825
100 20 6 1918525.84 3.30 38760 0 0.22 1942
100 20 9 2558151.56 14.32 167960 0 0.34 2198
100 30 3 593566.69 0.51 4060 0 0.33 2273
100 30 6 1257326.92 75.66 593775 0 0.65 4194
100 30 9 1914434.62 1825.49 14307150 0 1.25 6927
150 15 3 1546415.88 0.05 455 0 0.05 372
150 15 6 2698907.14 0.50 5005 0 0.14 1079
150 15 9 3977272.72 0.50 5005 0 0.18 1254
150 20 3 1187705.98 0.15 1140 0 0.14 762
150 20 6 2234857.77 5.01 38760 0 0.23 1454
150 20 9 2887852.42 21.86 167960 0 0.66 3559
150 30 3 697791.79 0.75 4060 0 0.55 2672
150 30 6 1465985.90 109.53 593775 0 0.87 3913
150 30 9 2219730.26 2670.02 14307150 0 1.67 7013
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Table 4.5: Algorithm’s performance on different parameters – instances with 50 nodes
Nodes p r α θ
w = 0.4 w = 0.6 w = 0.8
Obj. Time nbCuts nbEO Obj. Time nbCuts nbEO Obj. Time nbCuts nbEO
50 15 3 0.1 200 646491.81 0.21 11 180 792218.03 0.10 14 231 937944.26 0.08 18 294
50 15 3 0.2 400 668362.21 0.06 14 227 812856.55 0.05 18 292 957350.90 0.06 28 454
50 15 3 0.3 800 750129.29 0.03 11 180 887448.01 0.03 15 242 1024766.74 0.07 31 500
50 15 6 0.1 200 964558.04 0.04 16 259 1216939.34 0.06 28 455 1544510.95 0.06 28 456
50 15 6 0.2 400 991650.28 0.04 18 290 1247395.32 0.07 37 595 1575842.61 0.09 35 567
50 15 6 0.3 800 1084601.75 0.03 20 325 1346233.23 0.06 38 616 1673069.58 0.08 51 822
50 15 9 0.1 200 1223619.83 0.03 12 198 1551609.28 0.07 32 518 2186703.53 0.05 25 407
50 15 9 0.2 400 1254648.24 0.03 15 245 1577136.36 0.10 45 729 2235828.91 0.09 37 601
50 15 9 0.3 800 1364131.70 0.04 17 278 1717114.39 0.14 56 908 2373736.64 0.10 68 1096
50 20 3 0.1 200 467394.61 0.02 6 127 568948.23 0.03 12 257 670501.84 0.02 14 298
50 20 3 0.2 400 487809.61 0.01 6 127 589312.13 0.02 12 256 690814.66 0.03 19 404
50 20 3 0.3 800 557381.67 0.02 8 169 655578.85 0.04 21 446 753776.03 0.05 30 634
50 20 6 0.1 200 649288.37 0.03 20 425 854882.36 0.04 20 427 1116002.03 0.05 29 615
50 20 6 0.2 400 670232.07 0.04 22 469 879303.35 0.04 24 510 1142008.75 0.09 50 1057
50 20 6 0.3 800 748289.64 0.02 16 342 961221.39 0.07 46 973 1218942.84 0.09 64 1354
50 20 9 0.1 200 816174.32 0.02 14 298 1139635.64 0.05 35 740 1528079.96 0.07 39 825
50 20 9 0.2 400 841676.76 0.03 20 425 1166018.29 0.04 24 509 1555371.82 0.10 49 1036
50 20 9 0.3 800 929345.70 0.04 26 553 1251554.55 0.07 42 889 1645403.09 0.21 119 2514
50 30 3 0.1 200 197745.54 0.05 12 375 234906.98 0.09 22 687 307495.06 0.09 33 1029
50 30 3 0.2 400 214197.71 0.04 13 406 251285.12 0.06 22 686 323823.76 0.13 48 1495
50 30 3 0.3 800 266417.92 0.04 14 436 303305.38 0.05 19 593 375245.69 0.14 50 1557
50 30 6 0.1 200 366943.59 0.05 17 532 466957.56 0.08 27 842 580947.81 0.18 60 1865
50 30 6 0.2 400 385218.63 0.05 17 531 485931.33 0.08 27 844 600128.88 0.19 62 1927
50 30 6 0.3 800 444770.54 0.07 20 627 545229.68 0.08 29 904 656731.60 0.21 68 2114
50 30 9 0.1 200 458843.48 0.07 25 780 644215.57 0.15 52 1619 878623.87 0.23 69 2148
50 30 9 0.2 400 477460.29 0.14 48 1495 662224.00 0.11 37 1151 895736.85 0.38 116 3605
50 30 9 0.3 800 540754.61 0.11 40 1244 722042.89 0.14 45 1399 948530.98 0.39 112 3478
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Table 4.6: Algorithm’s performance on different parameters – instances with 75 nodes
Nodes p r α θ
w = 0.4 w = 0.6 w = 0.8
Obj. Time nbCuts nbEO Obj. Time nbCuts nbEO Obj. Time nbCuts nbEO
75 15 3 0.1 200 841154.86 0.02 13 210 934062.69 0.02 17 279 1083869.38 0.03 28 452
75 15 3 0.2 400 865100.88 0.02 14 226 958201.38 0.02 20 326 1109851.56 0.03 25 407
75 15 3 0.3 800 943327.40 0.02 14 229 1045096.59 0.03 23 375 1193996.58 0.04 32 518
75 15 6 0.1 200 1279956.32 0.02 11 179 1518375.05 0.03 21 341 1828591.49 0.05 40 645
75 15 6 0.2 400 1315230.17 0.02 11 179 1553551.90 0.03 26 425 1865672.19 0.05 39 630
75 15 6 0.3 800 1426897.78 0.02 16 260 1660920.48 0.03 25 407 1966862.85 0.05 41 664
75 15 9 0.1 200 1644592.67 0.02 17 276 2032639.17 0.03 23 373 2502527.64 0.04 30 486
75 15 9 0.2 400 1686103.69 0.02 16 262 2070857.62 0.04 31 506 2540367.20 0.08 55 889
75 15 9 0.3 800 1801648.37 0.02 19 311 2183489.78 0.05 33 539 2643466.74 0.11 75 1213
75 20 3 0.1 200 543153.23 0.02 8 170 650409.41 0.03 12 257 757665.59 0.04 18 384
75 20 3 0.2 400 567202.54 0.02 7 148 673835.08 0.03 14 296 780467.61 0.05 26 554
75 20 3 0.3 800 647595.74 0.02 10 213 749665.85 0.03 17 361 851735.95 0.05 27 570
75 20 6 0.1 200 753486.52 0.04 21 445 975119.92 0.07 32 682 1290260.77 0.07 32 680
75 20 6 0.2 400 780615.24 0.04 17 362 1004593.15 0.08 32 678 1318672.77 0.15 76 1605
75 20 6 0.3 800 868683.57 0.04 21 443 1096677.77 0.09 44 932 1401777.70 0.12 51 1078
75 20 9 0.1 200 946363.40 0.05 24 509 1295043.67 0.09 44 932 1749010.59 0.12 56 1189
75 20 9 0.2 400 973857.52 0.06 27 578 1325374.67 0.09 38 804 1778576.55 0.13 58 1226
75 20 9 0.3 800 1070560.97 0.09 48 1018 1421409.38 0.10 46 972 1865410.36 0.18 78 1646
75 30 3 0.1 200 248626.69 0.13 33 1030 289686.58 0.22 57 1775 379864.07 0.21 55 1711
75 30 3 0.2 400 266482.03 0.15 39 1219 307752.06 0.17 44 1370 398293.52 0.15 39 1214
75 30 3 0.3 800 320628.93 0.13 34 1060 365406.71 0.18 47 1461 457970.34 0.24 64 1993
75 30 6 0.1 200 370752.02 0.10 25 779 482767.05 0.15 36 1123 724110.45 0.25 58 1807
75 30 6 0.2 400 390536.39 0.15 39 1217 501293.43 0.22 56 1747 743765.98 0.26 64 1995
75 30 6 0.3 800 454649.26 0.13 33 1029 562133.23 0.15 35 1093 808828.24 0.42 103 3206
75 30 9 0.1 200 500797.23 0.12 29 905 638355.71 0.35 79 2459 1001377.41 0.39 83 2584
75 30 9 0.2 400 520446.55 0.11 27 843 657530.48 0.33 73 2275 1020613.97 0.44 95 2954
75 30 9 0.3 800 587472.52 0.13 32 1001 720537.44 0.45 89 2770 1082735.19 0.55 113 3513
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Table 4.7: Algorithm’s performance on different parameters – instances with 100 nodes
Nodes p r α θ
w = 0.4 w = 0.6 w = 0.8
Obj. Time nbCuts nbEO Obj. Time nbCuts nbEO Obj. Time nbCuts nbEO
100 15 3 0.1 200 851938.73 0.02 10 163 1016052.90 0.03 21 342 1180167.06 0.04 29 468
100 15 3 0.2 400 883125.84 0.02 15 243 1046088.34 0.02 14 228 1209050.85 0.04 26 423
100 15 3 0.3 800 990082.76 0.02 13 209 1145873.29 0.03 18 292 1301663.82 0.03 23 373
100 15 6 0.1 200 1207367.79 0.04 27 436 1445538.08 0.04 27 437 1895994.80 0.07 47 756
100 15 6 0.2 400 1232800.09 0.03 19 309 1485930.75 0.06 42 678 1936730.71 0.07 46 742
100 15 6 0.3 800 1332409.80 0.04 20 324 1608562.79 0.08 52 839 2050312.24 0.12 84 1354
100 15 9 0.1 200 1496908.67 0.02 14 228 1883939.12 0.07 42 675 2499328.26 0.08 48 775
100 15 9 0.2 400 1535290.62 0.03 21 341 1932646.31 0.07 45 722 2540767.89 0.13 68 1101
100 15 9 0.3 800 1671863.58 0.03 23 374 2087906.66 0.09 54 872 2673027.83 0.14 82 1321
100 20 3 0.1 200 609454.96 0.02 6 127 720915.31 0.04 15 320 832375.65 0.07 25 533
100 20 3 0.2 400 635698.99 0.02 6 127 746529.58 0.04 16 344 857360.18 0.07 28 596
100 20 3 0.3 800 722272.07 0.02 9 190 828418.26 0.04 15 321 934564.45 0.08 30 636
100 20 6 0.1 200 842712.64 0.06 24 510 1071876.96 0.11 43 913 1406135.68 0.14 48 1016
100 20 6 0.2 400 870520.87 0.05 21 447 1103987.03 0.10 41 870 1437096.25 0.19 80 1690
100 20 6 0.3 800 960711.79 0.06 24 510 1203369.67 0.09 36 765 1526960.28 0.20 81 1711
100 20 9 0.1 200 1078848.11 0.04 15 319 1412434.51 0.15 55 1164 1898835.73 0.18 60 1270
100 20 9 0.2 400 1109366.44 0.03 12 257 1445471.09 0.11 41 866 1931032.68 0.20 67 1417
100 20 9 0.3 800 1209879.67 0.04 17 361 1549416.04 0.08 29 613 2025199.92 0.24 80 1690
100 30 3 0.1 200 344839.05 0.09 18 568 371196.29 0.19 40 1246 444896.69 0.22 48 1493
100 30 3 0.2 400 363700.45 0.12 26 813 390420.60 0.14 30 936 464865.86 0.27 58 1807
100 30 3 0.3 800 419218.05 0.11 21 659 449422.09 0.14 29 903 529538.06 0.29 63 1960
100 30 6 0.1 200 458796.66 0.24 44 1374 605081.02 0.15 31 967 856012.39 0.26 52 1621
100 30 6 0.2 400 477548.54 0.27 54 1680 625445.13 0.17 35 1091 877726.26 0.42 84 2614
100 30 6 0.3 800 539078.99 0.23 47 1465 692520.93 0.26 51 1588 949886.66 0.57 114 3542
100 30 9 0.1 200 605321.88 0.15 30 939 779989.27 0.26 48 1495 1185328.34 0.39 77 2396
100 30 9 0.2 400 627581.86 0.17 34 1061 800507.95 0.35 67 2086 1206046.11 0.38 71 2212
100 30 9 0.3 800 699988.30 0.19 37 1153 868913.17 0.46 79 2458 1273243.94 0.56 105 3267
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Table 4.8: Algorithm’s performance on different parameters – instances with 150 nodes
Nodes p r α θ
w = 0.4 w = 0.6 w = 0.8
Obj. Time nbCuts nbEO Obj. Time nbCuts nbEO Obj. Time nbCuts nbEO
150 15 3 0.1 200 978091.13 0.02 10 163 1157034.39 0.03 13 214 1335977.64 0.05 24 391
150 15 3 0.2 400 1013516.61 0.03 14 227 1191149.70 0.05 24 393 1368782.79 0.05 25 405
150 15 3 0.3 800 1133839.75 0.05 22 354 1303359.69 0.05 23 375 1472879.62 0.06 31 500
150 15 6 0.1 200 1319742.13 0.08 36 582 1647836.05 0.09 42 681 2057133.77 0.11 48 775
150 15 6 0.2 400 1349494.47 0.08 37 599 1682488.02 0.10 46 742 2103901.45 0.14 63 1016
150 15 6 0.3 800 1464954.11 0.09 39 630 1799061.45 0.12 52 840 2231052.10 0.17 79 1270
150 15 9 0.1 200 1671972.32 0.04 19 307 2113443.08 0.12 51 821 2804872.55 0.14 54 871
150 15 9 0.2 400 1708514.78 0.04 20 322 2156616.49 0.12 52 836 2852898.90 0.15 65 1047
150 15 9 0.3 800 1848990.67 0.08 36 583 2292580.04 0.18 73 1175 3004224.55 0.28 103 1657
150 20 3 0.1 200 694426.32 0.04 11 234 834210.25 0.05 13 275 975199.10 0.09 25 530
150 20 3 0.2 400 722874.51 0.05 12 254 863337.46 0.20 15 319 1003800.41 0.11 31 656
150 20 3 0.3 800 817204.06 0.04 11 232 953210.56 0.06 19 403 1089217.07 0.11 32 676
150 20 6 0.1 200 967912.36 0.04 12 257 1235387.61 0.10 29 611 1541933.86 0.20 53 1120
150 20 6 0.2 400 998526.51 0.05 15 320 1266038.70 0.11 31 658 1572660.68 0.34 90 1901
150 20 6 0.3 800 1098849.57 0.05 13 279 1363699.07 0.09 27 570 1666501.60 0.26 73 1538
150 20 9 0.1 200 1180653.86 0.06 17 362 1508890.43 0.18 46 968 2048708.93 0.29 68 1436
150 20 9 0.2 400 1205621.14 0.06 17 360 1536997.97 0.18 48 1015 2079084.15 0.35 94 1984
150 20 9 0.3 800 1294461.72 0.08 22 466 1632219.54 0.24 60 1268 2174244.26 0.39 99 2089
150 30 3 0.1 200 414869.50 0.12 18 562 438490.91 0.31 45 1400 530829.62 0.36 54 1680
150 30 3 0.2 400 436341.13 0.12 17 532 459956.72 0.25 37 1153 553688.50 0.36 53 1651
150 30 3 0.3 800 498675.63 0.15 21 657 523762.45 0.26 39 1214 627217.23 0.38 57 1774
150 30 6 0.1 200 544925.55 0.24 34 1060 712363.14 0.22 32 999 1000880.61 0.37 53 1655
150 30 6 0.2 400 566447.44 0.25 36 1123 735667.92 0.27 39 1217 1025812.40 0.43 62 1933
150 30 6 0.3 800 636080.11 0.29 42 1309 811999.41 0.25 37 1153 1108433.96 0.55 80 2486
150 30 9 0.1 200 675773.69 0.27 36 1123 903661.83 0.47 62 1930 1370628.88 0.49 63 1965
150 30 9 0.2 400 699827.98 0.29 40 1249 927251.44 0.46 62 1931 1394749.76 0.76 103 3203
150 30 9 0.3 800 774115.34 0.30 41 1276 1005210.48 0.63 84 2611 1472280.18 1.01 135 4195
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4.4.2 Solving the Fortification Problem
Two methods in the literature can be adapted to solve FP: the tree-search implicit
enumeration method proposed by Scaparra and Church [76], which is an exact algorithm to
solve FP; and the greedy search heuristic algorithm proposed by Zhu et al. [96]. The proposed
logic-based Benders decomposition algorithm is compared with these two algorithms, and
the results are reported in Table 4.9- 4.12. The column titled “nbAPs” reports the number
of calls required to solve an AP. All of the APs are solved by the cutting plane method.
The column titled “ΔObj.” reports the difference between the objective value obtain by the
relevant algorithm and the objective value from the tree search algorithm. The algorithms
are set with a time limit of 3600 seconds. Because the tree search may need to explore
(rh+1−1)/(r−1) number of nodes [76], as expected, we observe that the tree search algorithm
is very sensitive to parameters h and r. The greedy algorithm is fastest among the three
methods, and the least sensitive to increases in parameters h and r. However, about 30% of
the solutions are not optimal. The logic-based Benders decomposition algorithm requires a
solution time comparable with the tree search solution time for instances with small values
of h and r. However, the solution time only increases moderately with h and r; thus, it has
an advantage in solving instances with large h and r. For the instances for which tree search
completes in a given time limit, that is, the solution is proven to be optimal, the logic-based
Benders decomposition algorithm always finds a solution with the same objective value. The
logic-based Benders decomposition algorithm finds even better solutions for three instances
when the tree search terminates due to the time limit.
94
Table 4.9: Algorithms performance comparison for FP – instances with 50 nodes
Nodes p h r
Tree search Greedy search LBD
Time nbAPs Obj. Time nbAPs ΔObj. Time nbAPs ΔObj.
50 15 3 3 1.57 25 576359.81 1.03 14 0 2.83 123 0
50 15 3 6 7.14 205 1014705.36 1.21 28 0 2.34 99 0
50 15 3 9 17.91 522 1545002.81 1.67 41 0 6.53 345 0
50 15 6 3 1.12 53 513927.51 0.52 27 16030.92 4.43 411 0
50 15 6 6 30.56 1200 754878.18 1.50 52 0 7.45 481 0
50 15 6 9 127.08 5387 990033.80 2.57 72 0 6.11 413 0
50 15 9 3 1.32 69 468233.12 0.66 40 0 5.31 637 0
50 15 9 6 51.94 2587 632548.83 1.92 71 0 4.31 291 0
50 15 9 9 208.78 11364 803304.32 3.28 101 0 3.70 354 0
50 20 3 3 0.87 24 487809.61 0.42 14 0 7.39 349 0
50 20 3 6 15.12 237 859628.19 1.89 28 0 16.93 333 0
50 20 3 9 56.45 563 1096057.21 4.62 41 0 18.58 225 0
50 20 6 3 1.52 43 391879.01 0.78 25 0 15.69 747 0
50 20 6 6 65.11 1303 561885.61 3.48 49 0 17.29 361 0
50 20 6 9 478.56 6401 748734.01 8.82 68 0 39.06 507 0
50 20 9 3 1.43 40 385594.23 1.08 37 0 317.88 21841 0
50 20 9 6 81.84 1730 496970.88 4.37 71 0 9.34 332 0
50 20 9 9 1104.28 18814 629121.70 10.84 101 0 24.95 563 0
50 30 3 3 6.12 36 248040.67 2.36 17 0 18.73 230 0
50 30 3 6 63.51 200 416827.89 8.60 30 26102.88 89.33 316 0
50 30 3 9 276.88 568 679664.45 19.62 43 0 139.11 343 0
50 30 6 3 14.70 97 221107.64 4.36 31 0 538.63 6936 0
50 30 6 6 434.89 1523 367165.16 16.06 52 9143.87 598.85 2766 0
50 30 6 9 3600.30 8176 495450.15 31.66 73 41090.27 985.66 2515 0
50 30 9 3 25.17 161 177946.84 6.67 46 0 82.92 1252 0
50 30 9 6 1486.63 6694 283285.57 23.53 72 0 588.83 2353 0
50 30 9 9 3600.72 10272 379873.48 52.35 107 4335.09 971.75 2556 0
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Table 4.10: Algorithms performance comparison for FP – instances with 75 nodes
Nodes p h r
Tree search Greedy search LBD
Time nbAPs Obj. Time nbAPs ΔObj. Time nbAPs ΔObj.
75 15 3 3 0.83 31 771614.08 0.34 14 0 3.65 226 0
75 15 3 6 9.56 215 1226376.57 1.22 28 0 3.99 140 0
75 15 3 9 26.15 513 1792170.32 2.26 41 0 6.65 269 0
75 15 6 3 1.93 76 633034.67 0.61 29 31059.66 8.08 656 0
75 15 6 6 45.29 1364 923224.84 1.97 51 0.00 9.23 431 0
75 15 6 9 186.50 5700 1173857.88 3.33 71 0 7.86 378 0
75 15 9 3 2.27 98 573274.94 0.84 43 0 3.14 306 0
75 15 9 6 78.71 3120 779724.55 2.46 72 0 4.07 270 0
75 15 9 9 293.14 12016 956783.96 4.24 101 2348.67 4.22 345 0
75 20 3 3 1.39 28 567202.54 0.67 14 0 5.89 186 0
75 20 3 6 23.62 237 1033377.15 3.04 28 0 36.58 458 0
75 20 3 9 58.58 441 1304001.37 5.88 41 0 31.51 335 0
75 20 6 3 2.59 48 467689.76 1.40 28 0 16.22 537 0
75 20 6 6 119.54 1473 663518.28 4.46 49 64167.79 22.52 359 0
75 20 6 9 519.26 4917 879042.78 10.81 71 0 48.71 667 0
75 20 9 3 2.69 53 464545.73 1.80 39 0 135.12 6942 0
75 20 9 6 204.22 3114 607673.73 5.29 69 0 27.04 692 0
75 20 9 9 1621.88 22524 739335.97 12.82 100 4083.85 25.18 448 0
75 30 3 3 11.38 35 308702.30 3.92 16 0 29.53 204 0
75 30 3 6 88.95 130 519644.36 17.92 30 0 126.43 233 0
75 30 3 9 374.38 403 737304.84 40.47 43 0 263.70 288 0
75 30 6 3 39.11 140 293699.82 6.31 28 3328.73 2602.49 21164 0
75 30 6 6 873.67 1435 419216.68 33.61 52 24859.59 558.01 1594 0
75 30 6 9 3600.33 3581 592307.48 84.34 74 41585.32 3616.80 5367 0
75 30 9 3 68.16 271 255942.65 9.60 42 0 334.70 3271 0
75 30 9 6 3260.57 8170 370632.39 46.91 77 5317.03 1132.90 3937 0
75 30 9 9 3600.12 5257 494146.25 105.93 110 23736.04 2636.10 5160 -12784.06
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Table 4.11: Algorithms performance comparison for FP – instances with 100 nodes
Nodes p h r
Tree search Greedy search LBD
Time nbAPs Obj. Time nbAPs ΔObj. Time nbAPs ΔObj.
100 15 3 3 1.21 29 860663.28 0.52 14 0 6.66 305 0
100 15 3 6 12.94 204 1357508.07 1.76 28 0 6.08 152 0
100 15 3 9 33.99 509 2003174.51 3.01 41 0 10.13 321 0
100 15 6 3 3.92 108 705433.14 0.92 31 43642.05 5.73 334 0
100 15 6 6 65.05 1384 1021655.03 2.78 52 0 11.33 381 0
100 15 6 9 249.63 5599 1287003.25 4.64 71 0 7.76 315 0
100 15 9 3 3.86 118 654041.10 1.36 46 0 4.99 368 0
100 15 9 6 102.92 2929 874605.92 3.54 73 0 4.78 270 0
100 15 9 9 390.22 12043 1081252.95 6.01 102 0 3.05 262 0
100 20 3 3 2.49 32 635698.99 1.01 14 0 7.58 168 0
100 20 3 6 33.45 241 1170888.29 4.60 30 10693.21 78.81 674 0
100 20 3 9 83.77 450 1456946.56 9.26 43 79151.73 38.27 280 0
100 20 6 3 4.98 60 545069.83 2.38 28 0 34.22 733 0
100 20 6 6 172.04 1461 745984.03 7.93 50 0 35.57 345 0
100 20 6 9 870.46 5647 985138.79 16.45 72 0 50.47 466 0
100 20 9 3 4.82 60 527275.04 3.06 39 0 120.87 4161 0
100 20 9 6 280.86 2994 685388.47 9.68 70 0 42.20 816 0
100 20 9 9 2537.95 25147 838072.48 19.51 100 111130.75 35.38 545 0
100 30 3 3 12.22 32 377883.17 4.60 16 0 38.35 231 0
100 30 3 6 104.17 118 601722.02 23.02 30 0 170.51 259 0
100 30 3 9 462.61 368 828137.57 55.21 43 0 404.14 316 0
100 30 6 3 39.16 102 341513.52 10.27 30 0 1880.08 9415 0
100 30 6 6 1098.38 1217 496235.51 45.21 52 14034.94 967.08 1691 0
100 30 6 9 3600.12 3167 662208.77 118.95 72 32942.93 2637.81 2698 0
100 30 9 3 73.78 201 309779.23 14.59 42 0 899.73 5848 0
100 30 9 6 3600.19 6082 423395.01 53.96 72 2519.00 1042.40 2402 0
100 30 9 9 3600.17 3574 562349.98 127.60 102 19955.23 3499.95 4822 -8245.34
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Table 4.12: Algorithms performance comparison for FP – instances with 150 nodes
Nodes p h r
Tree search Greedy search LBD
Time nbAPs Obj. Time nbAPs ΔObj. Time nbAPs ΔObj.
150 15 3 3 1.99 31 1013516.61 0.84 14 0 10.35 280 0
150 15 3 6 22.65 220 1608989.32 3.00 28 0 10.15 163 0
150 15 3 9 50.68 487 2258751.20 5.18 41 0 13.81 280 0
150 15 6 3 4.13 67 843480.11 1.53 28 0 27.27 917 0
150 15 6 6 96.53 1114 1241652.98 5.02 51 0 38.36 821 0
150 15 6 9 361.47 5077 1526860.23 7.93 71 0 14.64 386 0
150 15 9 3 4.31 75 807567.25 1.94 41 0 13.36 801 0
150 15 9 6 149.77 2589 1052999.80 5.44 69 0 8.38 347 0
150 15 9 9 573.06 11708 1289876.08 9.67 99 0 6.66 339 0
150 20 3 3 3.69 23 722874.51 1.95 14 0 17.08 205 0
150 20 3 6 53.69 200 1218049.89 7.79 28 0 65.42 279 0
150 20 3 9 154.10 491 1698605.53 15.13 41 0 67.09 313 0
150 20 6 3 5.90 34 656362.21 3.60 25 0 123.11 1511 0
150 20 6 6 277.92 1126 892969.86 15.61 48 0 76.73 448 0
150 20 6 9 1909.65 7372 1167456.35 27.66 70 916.97 85.45 524 0
150 20 9 3 6.21 40 632827.03 5.56 41 0 249.59 5276 0
150 20 9 6 625.29 3773 825139.47 23.14 74 4261.55 166.76 1737 0
150 20 9 9 3600.06 22324 1015841.44 35.02 101 22164.32 131.88 1235 0
150 30 3 3 19.94 33 448488.62 6.79 16 0 62.30 259 0
150 30 3 6 162.58 119 712366.40 35.60 30 0 426.34 427 0
150 30 3 9 683.84 373 969595.10 85.02 43 0 637.96 344 0
150 30 6 3 68.59 111 414030.45 14.21 29 0 964.17 3764 0
150 30 6 6 2218.82 1596 594611.90 67.78 52 18955.78 2260.65 2741 0
150 30 6 9 3602.11 2402 774668.70 158.81 72 55835.42 3179.83 2440 0
150 30 9 3 107.56 184 370223.08 21.92 43 0 460.65 2350 0
150 30 9 6 3600.71 3959 511672.90 81.96 72 4171.87 3067.12 4884 0
150 30 9 9 3600.08 2221 682826.96 164.74 101 998.87 3607.46 4190 -18626.93
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Research
5.1 Conclusions
In Chapter 3, we study a reliable facility location problem that generalizes the classical
UFLP by considering random facility disruptions. We study the problem with the
disruption distribution in its general form, that is, heterogeneous failure rates and correlated
failures. We propose a novel way to characterize the available information of the disruption
distribution. With that, we propose a robust reliable facility location model that includes
several important problems studied in the literature. We propose a cutting plane algorithm
based on the supermodularity of the problem. For the cases in which the distribution is
fully known, the computational results show that the cutting plane algorithm not only
outperforms the best-known algorithm in the literature that solves uncorrelated disruptions,
but also efficiently solves moderate-sized problems with correlated disruptions. For the cases
in which only marginal failure probabilities are known, the problem is equivalent to solving
a stochastic model with a special distribution. The computational results show that the
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cutting plane algorithm outperforms the Benders decomposition. The heuristic algorithm,
multi-start tabu search, is shown to be very efficient and effective in solving large instances
for the instances in which failures are independent.
In Chapter 4, we present a model along with solution methods for determining the optimal
fortification plans for a distribution network considering both random facility disruptions and
worst-case intelligent attacks. The model generalizes several important problems studied in
the literature such as RIM, RIMF and RIMF-p. We show that the attacker’s problem is
equivalent to a supermodular function maximization problem with coordinate constraints,
and an exact cutting plane algorithm is proposed. As shown by computational study, the
cutting plane algorithm is very efficient in solving the attacker’s problem and significantly
outperforms the enumeration method. For the overall fortification problem, we show that
the tree search algorithm developed for RIMF is also applicable for solving the problem,
and a logic-based Benders decomposition algorithm is proposed. Computational study
demonstrates that the logic-based Benders decomposition algorithm has advantages over
the tree search algorithm when h, the number of facilities to fortify and r, the number of
facilities to attack, are relatively large.
5.2 Future Research Direction
The problems we study only consider the effects of facility disruption on transportation costs;
in reality, the effects can be manifold and complex. Thus, it would be interesting to take
more realistic cost components into consideration. It would also be interesting to study the
problems in a multi-product and/or multi-layer setting.
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It would also be interesting to extend the models studied in this work to solve critical
infrastructure problems. The location and protection of facilities is important from a national
security perspective and one mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is to
improve critical infrastructure security and resilience. The DHS has identified 16 critical
infrastructure sectors (CIs) that play a critical role in national security. Almost all of them
are associated with certain facility types, such as cellular towers in the communications sector
and power plants in the energy sector. One important characteristic of CIs is that they are
interconnected and interdependent on multiple levels. The interdependency of CIs is either
caused by physical proximity or operational interaction. Because the models we studied are
relevant for contexts with correlated disruptions, the solution methods may be adaptable to
solve location and fortification problems for CIs.
For both problems investigated by this study, facilities are assumed to have unlimited
capacity. The models and theoretical results in this work will no longer be applicable
when facility capacity is considered. When capacity is considered, the nearest assignment
property is no longer holds and one must solve an assignment problem to evaluate a solution.
Moreover, the supermodular properties are very probably violated. Therefore, it is much
harder to solve the problem once facility capacity is considered.
For the fortification problem, there are several possible research directions. First, h and
r are predetermined/known in this study, but in practice, h is actually a decision made by
the network planner and r is often hard to accurately estimate when the network planner
makes the fortification decision. It would therefore be interesting to extend the model to
explicitly model h as a decision variable and r with a probability distribution. Second, the
network/facilities are predetermined. It is interesting to extend this work to consider facility
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location decisions, in other words, to simultaneously make the location and fortification
decisions
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A Parameter-Tuning of the MSTS Algorithm
A.1 Parameter StabilityLimit
We first try to tune the parameter StabilityLimit – the number of iterations without
improvement before completing one start of the tabu search. We test the tabu search
with different values of StabilityLimit for solving benchmark instances with 50, 75 and
100 nodes with α = 1. Table A1 gives the results. For each row, 10000 random runs of the
tabu search (1 start) are performed. Column titled “Popt” reports the percentage of runs
producing the optimal solution (we compare the objective value and the best objective value
obtained by the exact algorithm). Column titled “Iterations” reports the average number
of iterations for each run of tabu search. Column titled “Time” reports the average time
in seconds for each run of tabu search. It can be seen from the table, in general, both the
percentage of runs producing the optimal and the average number of iterations increase with
the value of StabilityLimit. For each problem scale, the computational time is proportional
to number of iterations. Thus, there is a need to choose a value for StabilityLimit to
balance solution quality and solution time. For example, the 50 nodes instance, when
StabilityLimit is set to 1, on average, it takes 23 iterations and the probability of finding
optimal solution is 3.27%. If we perform 10 runs of the tabu search, the chance of finding
optimal solution becomes Popt = 1− (1− 3.27%)10 = 28.28% and it takes 230 iterations on
average. Comparing these number with StabilityLimit = 100, it is obviously better to set
StabilityLimit = 100. In table A2, we compute a the chances of finding optimal solution
of different value of StabilityLimit by assuming a total 500 iterations available. It can be
seen from the table, in general, the chances first increase then decrease with the value of
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StabilityLimit. StabilityLimit = 20 has a very good performance and is chosen for all
remaining experiments.
Table A1: Tabu search performance with regard to StabilityLimit
Nodes StabilityLimit Popt(%) Iterations Time
50 1 3.27 23 0.01
50 3 8.65 26 0.01
50 5 11.8 30 0.01
50 10 16.36 40 0.01
50 20 65.26 61 0.02
50 50 74.03 96 0.03
50 100 79.39 150 0.05
50 200 78.65 251 0.08
75 1 1.9 34 0.04
75 3 8.59 39 0.04
75 5 12.31 42 0.04
75 10 44.36 54 0.05
75 20 66.27 70 0.06
75 50 68.56 103 0.09
75 100 70.04 156 0.13
75 200 72.22 262 0.20
100 1 9.41 46 0.10
100 3 11.29 50 0.11
100 5 11.68 54 0.11
100 10 11.53 61 0.12
100 20 12.39 74 0.14
100 50 12.04 109 0.19
100 100 12.89 160 0.26
100 200 12.43 263 0.40
Table A2: Chance of finding optimal solutions with 500 iterations
Nodes
StabilityLimit
1 3 5 10 20 50 100 200
50 0.5195 0.8210 0.8770 0.8920 0.9998 0.9991 0.9949 0.9536
75 0.2458 0.6817 0.7869 0.9958 0.9996 0.9963 0.9790 0.9133
100 0.6597 0.6981 0.6865 0.6332 0.5907 0.4462 0.3495 0.2234
A.2 Parameter nStarts
We examine how the number of starts affects the algorithms performance. We solve the
benchmark instances with α = 1 with difference number of starts. The results are reported
in Table A3. In the column titled “Chance”, we compute the estimated chance of finding
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optimal solution based on Table A1. It can be seen that when the chance of find optimal
solution increases with the increase of number of starts and the chances become very close
to 1 when the number of starts greater than 20. From the table, we observe that the number
of iterations and time used is proportional to the number of starts.
Table A3: Algorithm performance with regard to nStarts
Nodes nStarts Upper Bound Iterations Time Chance
Min Ave Max
50 3 1,020,180 1,020,180 1,020,180 176.2 0.0693 0.958073
50 5 1,020,180 1,020,180 1,020,180 305.4 0.1060 0.994940
50 10 1,020,180 1,020,180 1,020,180 589.3 0.2014 0.999974
50 20 1,020,180 1,020,180 1,020,180 1250.2 0.4331 1.000000
50 50 1,020,180 1,020,180 1,020,180 3108.3 1.0666 1.000000
50 80 1,020,180 1,020,180 1,020,180 4814.0 1.6802 1.000000
50 100 1,020,180 1,020,180 1,020,180 6137.6 2.1053 1.000000
75 3 1,148,490 1,148,490 1,148,490 218.0 0.2022 0.961625
75 5 1,148,490 1,148,490 1,148,490 369.2 0.3435 0.995634
75 10 1,148,490 1,148,490 1,148,490 711.1 0.6553 0.999981
75 20 1,148,490 1,148,490 1,148,490 1391.9 1.2463 1.000000
75 50 1,148,490 1,148,490 1,148,490 3549.5 3.2131 1.000000
75 80 1,148,490 1,148,490 1,148,490 5653.6 5.1599 1.000000
75 100 1,148,490 1,148,490 1,148,490 6908.1 6.2522 1.000000
100 3 1,252,600 1,255,250 1,259,110 228.2 0.4349 0.327548
100 5 1,252,600 1,253,930 1,260,060 378.6 0.7543 0.483859
100 10 1,252,600 1,252,890 1,253,580 744.3 1.4543 0.733598
100 20 1,252,600 1,252,600 1,252,600 1532.5 2.9813 0.929030
100 50 1,252,600 1,252,600 1,252,600 3687.9 6.9429 0.998658
100 80 1,252,600 1,252,600 1,252,600 5857.5 11.0321 0.999975
100 100 1,252,600 1,252,600 1,252,600 7436.0 13.7748 0.999998
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